{"title":"仍然不成功:成功语义学的未解决问题","authors":"Javier González de Prado Salas","doi":"10.1387/THEORIA.17736","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.","PeriodicalId":45699,"journal":{"name":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","volume":"57 1","pages":"5-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics\",\"authors\":\"Javier González de Prado Salas\",\"doi\":\"10.1387/THEORIA.17736\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45699,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"5-22\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17736\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1387/THEORIA.17736","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics
Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.
期刊介绍:
THEORIA is open to original and relevant papers from any of the fields covered by the journal, i.e. logic and philosophy of logic, history and philosophy of mathematics, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind and cognition. Articles in English and Spanish are preferred, but the journal also accepts articles written in any of the languages of the Iberian Peninsula.