仍然不成功:成功语义学的未解决问题

IF 0.8 4区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Javier González de Prado Salas
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引用次数: 1

摘要

成功语义学是一种意旨理论,它根据由此产生的行为的成功条件来表征心理表征的真实条件。Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013)和Dokic和Engel (Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003)修改了这一理论,以保护它免受攻击其先前版本的反对意见。我认为,这两项提议似乎都有决定性的缺陷。更具体地说,这些修正后的理论没有充分处理我们行动成功的不可预见障碍的无限可能性。我认为,忽视障碍的问题在很大程度上破坏了成功语义,包括布莱克本的替代公式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics
Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them.  Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel ( Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
16.70%
发文量
13
审稿时长
7 weeks
期刊介绍: THEORIA is open to original and relevant papers from any of the fields covered by the journal, i.e. logic and philosophy of logic, history and philosophy of mathematics, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind and cognition. Articles in English and Spanish are preferred, but the journal also accepts articles written in any of the languages of the Iberian Peninsula.
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