免费附加服务

IF 1.9 4区管理学 Q3 BUSINESS

Service Science Pub Date : 2022-08-31 DOI:10.1287/serv.2022.0307

P. Gao, XingYu Fu, Haoyu Liu, Ying‐ju Chen

{"title":"免费附加服务","authors":"P. Gao, XingYu Fu, Haoyu Liu, Ying‐ju Chen","doi":"10.1287/serv.2022.0307","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines a seller’s offering of free add-ons in services. We build a stylized model where the seller decides the level of add-on provision to enhance its core service, and consumers make discrete choices between the seller and an outside option. When the seller supplies its service through a single channel, we show that the optimal add-on provision is unimodal in the difference between the seller’s service quality and the outside option, comparable with the existing literature. When the service is supplied through multiple channels, we show that the seller may make nonidentical add-on provisions among channels. If the cost of add-on provision is low, the seller should adopt a differentiation strategy. If the cost is high, the seller should adopt a homogenization strategy. Various extensions are considered to establish the robustness of our results.","PeriodicalId":46249,"journal":{"name":"Service Science","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Free Add-Ons in Services\",\"authors\":\"P. Gao, XingYu Fu, Haoyu Liu, Ying‐ju Chen\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/serv.2022.0307\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper examines a seller’s offering of free add-ons in services. We build a stylized model where the seller decides the level of add-on provision to enhance its core service, and consumers make discrete choices between the seller and an outside option. When the seller supplies its service through a single channel, we show that the optimal add-on provision is unimodal in the difference between the seller’s service quality and the outside option, comparable with the existing literature. When the service is supplied through multiple channels, we show that the seller may make nonidentical add-on provisions among channels. If the cost of add-on provision is low, the seller should adopt a differentiation strategy. If the cost is high, the seller should adopt a homogenization strategy. Various extensions are considered to establish the robustness of our results.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46249,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Service Science\",\"volume\":\"71 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Service Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2022.0307\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Service Science","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2022.0307","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇论文考察了卖家提供的免费附加服务。我们构建了一个程式化的模型，在这个模型中，卖方决定附加配置的级别以增强其核心服务，消费者在卖方和外部选项之间做出离散的选择。当卖方通过单一渠道提供服务时，我们证明了最优附加条款在卖方服务质量与外部选项之间的差异是单峰的，与现有文献相当。当服务通过多个渠道提供时，我们表明卖方可能在不同的渠道之间制定不相同的附加条款。如果附加条款的成本较低，卖方应采取差异化策略。如果成本较高，卖方应采取同质化策略。考虑了各种扩展来建立我们的结果的鲁棒性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Free Add-Ons in Services

The paper examines a seller’s offering of free add-ons in services. We build a stylized model where the seller decides the level of add-on provision to enhance its core service, and consumers make discrete choices between the seller and an outside option. When the seller supplies its service through a single channel, we show that the optimal add-on provision is unimodal in the difference between the seller’s service quality and the outside option, comparable with the existing literature. When the service is supplied through multiple channels, we show that the seller may make nonidentical add-on provisions among channels. If the cost of add-on provision is low, the seller should adopt a differentiation strategy. If the cost is high, the seller should adopt a homogenization strategy. Various extensions are considered to establish the robustness of our results.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Service Science Multiple-

CiteScore

3.30

自引率

4.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： Service Science publishes innovative and original papers on all topics related to service, including work that crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries. It is the primary forum for presenting new theories and new empirical results in the emerging, interdisciplinary science of service, incorporating research, education, and practice, documenting empirical, modeling, and theoretical studies of service and service systems. Topics covered include but are not limited to the following: Service Management, Operations, Engineering, Economics, Design, and Marketing Service System Analysis and Computational Simulation Service Theories and Research Methods Case Studies and Application Areas, such as healthcare, energy, finance, information technology, logistics, and public services.