企业避税是否促进了管理帝国的建立?

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Syed Shams , Sudipta Bose , Abeyratna Gunasekarage
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引用次数: 10

摘要

我们利用1991年至2015年期间来自美国的35,060家公司的年度观察数据,研究了企业避税与帝国建设之间的关系。我们通过对文献中使用的四种流行的帝国建设代理进行因子分析,构建了一个复合帝国建设度量。我们发现,在我们的样本中,这一综合措施与用于代表公司避税的四个代理之间存在正相关关系。正如我们的研究结果所表明的那样,采用避税策略的公司存在代理问题,而避税策略反过来又通过积极的增长和资产积累促进了管理层的租金提取。此外,在治理薄弱、监督机制不健全、首席执行官(CEO)权力较大、企业社会责任(CSR)绩效较差的企业中,企业避税与管理帝国建设的关系更为明显。我们还发现,帝国建设驱动的避税导致企业估值降低。我们的结果仍然不敏感,即使采用几个稳健性测试。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does corporate tax avoidance promote managerial empire building?

We examine the association between corporate tax avoidance and empire building using 35,060 firm-year observations from the United States (US) for the period 1991–2015. We build a composite empire building measure by conducting a factor analysis on four popular empire building proxies used in the literature. We find a positive association between this composite measure and the four proxies used to represent the tax avoidance of firms in our sample. As our results suggest, agency problems are inflicted upon firms employing tax avoidance strategies which, in turn, facilitate managerial rent extraction through aggressiveness in growth and the accumulation of assets. Furthermore, the relationship of corporate tax avoidance to managerial empire building is found to be more pronounced in firms with weak governance, poor monitoring mechanisms, greater Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power and weak corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We also find that empire building-motivated tax avoidance leads to lower firm valuation. Our results remain insensitive even when employing several robustness tests.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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