区块链赋能金融的演化博弈研究——运输仓储融资

Chuanxi Qin, Yizhao Hong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文以区块链支持的金融运输仓库(FTW)融资业务为基础,以中小企业的单边违约和共谋违约两种违约模式为切入点,构建了引入区块链技术(BT)前后FTW的关键参与者、金融机构(fi)和中小企业之间的演化博弈(EG)模型。并对引入BT前后博弈系统的演变进行了比较和讨论。最后进行了数值模拟。研究发现:(1)基于区块链的FTW融资模式可以有效防止中小企业的违约行为。(2) BT可以通过高违约成本形成的严格监管环境对中小企业的违约行为进行监管。(3)库存质押贷款利率和FTW融资贷款利率的提高可以加速金融机构向贷款稳定策略的演进;生产收益率和串谋骗取贷款的欺诈成本越大,越会鼓励金融机构和中小企业选择积极的融资策略;共谋骗贷概率的增加将缩短中小企业履行合同策略的演化时间,增加金融机构借贷策略的演化时间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on Evolutionary Game of Blockchain Enabling Finance-Transportation and Warehouse Financing
Based on the financing business of the finance-transportation and warehouse (FTW) enabled by blockchain, this paper takes the two default modes of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), unilateral default and collusion default as the entry point, and constructs an evolutionary game (EG) model between the key players, financial institutions (FIs) and SMEs of the FTW before and after the introduction of blockchain technology (BT), and compares and discusses the evolution of the game system before and after the introduction of BT. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out. The findings are as follows: (1) The blockchain enabled FTW financing mode can effectively prevent the default behavior of SMEs. (2) BT can supervise the default behaviors of SMEs through strict regulatory environment formed by high default costs. (3) The increase of inventory pledge loan rate and FTW financing loan rate can accelerate the evolution of FIs to the loan stability strategy; The greater the return rate of production and the fraud cost of colluding to defraud the loan, the more the FIs and SMEs will be encouraged to choose the active financing strategy; The increase in the probability of conspiracy to cheat loans will shorten the time for SMEs to evolve the strategy of keeping contracts, and increase the time for FIs to evolve the strategy of lending.
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