Unobserved-Offers讨价还价

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20211524

A. Wolitzky

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引用次数: 2

摘要

我研究最后通牒议价与不完全遵守的报价。即使玩家的偏好是常识，不完全观察到的提议也必须以正概率被拒绝。嘈杂的观察意味着被拒绝的风险更大。在重复最后通牒议价中，如果对方的出价信号也被对方观察到，则应答方可以获得正收益，但如果对方的出价信号是私有的，则不能获得正收益。在交替条件的讨价还价中，当一方的条件被更精确地观察到而对方的条件被更不精确地观察到时，一方的情况会更好。可能的应用包括国际关系、监管、委托代理和产品质量提供。(凝胶c73, c78, d82)

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Unobserved-Offers Bargaining

I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection. In repeated ultimatum bargaining, the responding party can obtain a positive payoff if his signal of the opponent’s offer is also observed by the opponent herself, but not if his signal is private. In alternating-offers bargaining, a player is better off when her own offers are observed more precisely and her opponent’s offers are observed less precisely. Possible applications include international relations, regulation, principal-agency, and product quality provision. (JEL C73, C78, D82)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.