双边市场的二级价格歧视

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2016-06-27 DOI:10.1515/rne-2015-0051

Enrico Böhme

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引用次数: 10

摘要

摘要本文对双边垄断市场上的二次价格歧视问题进行了分析。在市场两侧有两种不同类型的代理的框架下，我们证明了在不完全信息下，高需求代理的平台访问程度严格低于完全信息下的基准水平。此外，我们还发现，在垄断最优中，如果与相反市场端的代理商的互动程度是合同特定的，则低需求代理商的合同可能比高需求代理商的合同更昂贵。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets

Abstract The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a framework with two distinct types of agents on either side of the market, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly lower than the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, we find that it is possible in the monopoly optimum that the contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is contract-specific.

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来源期刊

Review of Network Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.