垄断双边市场中的负集团内部网络外部性

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2018-06-26 DOI:10.1515/rne-2017-0054

Gokce Kurucu

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引用次数: 4

摘要

摘要:本文分析了在双边市场中，当双方的代理商都倾向于自己一方的平台竞争力较弱时，垄断平台的最优市场结构和定价策略;也就是说，在具有负集团内部网络外部性的市场中。结果表明，均衡市场结构随负集团内部网络外部性程度的变化而变化。如果负的网络外部性是巨大的，也就是说，如果一个代理的负效用由于其一方的市场规模较大而很高(足够高)，那么媒人的利润最大化策略将是将一方的最高类型与另一方的所有代理相匹配。在这种情况下，媒人会向前者收取高额的入场费，并允许后者的代理人免费进入。然而，如果网络外部性不是很大，那么媒人将通过从双方匹配相等数量的代理来实现利润最大化。因此，本文给出了双边市场中媒人使用单程序定价机制时的不对称定价机制的解释。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Negative Intra Group Network Externalities in a Monopolistic Two-Sided Market

Abstract This paper analyzes the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform in a two-sided market where the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less competitive on their side; that is, in a market with negative intra-group network externalities. Results show that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative intra-group network externalities. If the negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility due to a larger sized market on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other side. In that case, the matchmaker will charge a high entrance fee from the former side and allow free entrance to the agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities are not substantial, then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided markets when the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule.

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来源期刊

Review of Network Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.