{"title":"认识论的借口和确定性的感觉","authors":"J. Vollet","doi":"10.1093/analys/anac038","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Gerken’s On Folk Epistemology, 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm.","PeriodicalId":82310,"journal":{"name":"Philosophic research and analysis","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty\",\"authors\":\"J. Vollet\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/analys/anac038\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Gerken’s On Folk Epistemology, 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82310,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophic research and analysis\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophic research and analysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac038\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophic research and analysis","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac038","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Gerken’s On Folk Epistemology, 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm.
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