超越法治的起诉:通过延期起诉协议施加的公司委托

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Jennifer H. Arlen
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引用次数: 30

摘要

美国公司刑事执法政策鼓励检察官签订延期和不起诉协议(D/NPAs),对发现有不当行为的公司实施公司改革。本文的结论是,管理检察官使用D/NPA授权的程序与法治不一致。法治要求行政部门的个人行为者不能被赋予足够的权力来限制他人的权利,以实现个人目标,包括对公共利益的特殊概念。为了满足法治,现代政府授予行政部门行为者自由裁量权,通过限制授予的权力范围和要求对决策进行外部监督来约束这种权力。通过申诉的正式执行和正式的机构规则制定采用这两种机制。相比之下,使用D/ npa创建和施加新职责的检察官在其事前干预权力的范围上几乎没有受到限制。它们也很少受到司法审查的监督。将自由裁量权广泛授予个别检察官办公室是不符合法治的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed through Deferred Prosecution Agreements
U.S. corporate criminal enforcement policy encourages prosecutors to enter into deferred and non-prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) that impose corporate reform mandates on firms with detected misconduct. This article concludes that the process governing prosecutors’ use of D/NPA mandates is inconsistent with the rule of law. The rule of law requires that individual executive branch actors not be given sufficient authority to restrict the rights of others to achieve personal aims, including idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest. To satisfy the rule of law, modern governments granting discretion to executive branch actors constrain this authority by both limiting the scope of authority granted and requiring external oversight of decisions. Formal enforcement through pleas and formal agency rule-making employ both mechanisms. By contrast, prosecutors who use D/NPAs to create and impose new duties face few limitations on either the scope of their ex ante authority to intervene. They also face little oversight through judicial review. This broad grant of discretion to individual prosecutors’ offices is inconsistent with the rule of law.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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