央行沟通设计:迈向货币政策透明化

IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Yuliia Shapoval
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文的研究对象是中央银行的沟通设计(特别是目标受众、渠道和工具)和中央银行的透明度测量。目的是总结央行沟通政策的概念基础,并阐明NBU货币政策的透明度。方法。本文采用Dincer和Eichengreen(2014)以及al - mashat等人(2018)的透明度测量方法,使用NBU截至2021年公布的文件和网站数据。结果。强调沟通设计应基于中央银行的沟通目标、确定的利益相关者和目标群体的信息需求、渠道和工具的应用能力。确保对货币政策的信心,需要简化语言和格式,以反映公众的利益。中央银行与公众的沟通渠道和互动类型的作用日益增强。透明度的含义、标准和指数(Eijffinger-Geraats、cer- eichengreen、crow - meade、Cournede-Minegishi、CBT-IT指数)正在考虑之中。根据Dincer和Eichengreen的说法,NBU的透明度指数达到了近乎完美的12分(满分15分),肯定了NBU在政治和政策透明度方面的进步。NBU的CBT-IT透明度指数得分为11.45(满分20分),这表明,鉴于货币政策制定过程的改进(满分7分5.75分)和货币政策目标的透明度(满分3分2.5分),需要消除旨在支持全面通胀预测目标(满分9分3.2分)的FPAS的差距。NBU透明度水平的提高反映了其沟通政策的发展,因为货币政策的透明度需要通过多种渠道和工具向明确的目标受众传递持续和连贯的信息,遵循明确的战略沟通目的。价值/创意。央行沟通设计是金融市场参与者信任的基础,有利于货币政策的透明度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION DESIGN: TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY OF MONETARY POLICY
The object of the article is central bank communication design (particularly target audience, channels and instruments) and central banks’ transparency measurement. The purpose is to summarise the central bank communication policy's conceptual basics and clarify how transparent the NBU’s monetary policy is. Methodology. The paper applies the Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and Al-Mashat et al. (2018) methods of transparency measurement, using the NBU’s published documents and website data as of 2021. Results. It has been emphasized that communication design should be based on central bank’s communication objectives, information demand from defined stakeholders and target groups, capabilities of application of channels and instruments. Ensuring confidence in monetary policy calls for simplified language and format that reflects the general public's interest. The shift to the growing role of the type of communication channel and interaction of central bank with the general public are marked out. The meaning of transparency, criteria, and indices (Eijffinger-Geraats, Dincer-Eichengreen, Crowe-Meade, Cournede-Minegishi, CBT-IT index) are under consideration. According to Dincer and Eichengreen, the NBU’s transparency index reaches almost a perfect score of 12 (out of 15), affirming NBU’s political and policy transparency improvements. The NBU’s CBT-IT transparency index scores 11.45 (out of 20), which points to the need to eliminate gaps of the FPAS designed to support full-fledged inflation- forecast-targeting (3.2 out of 9) in the light of improvements in the monetary policymaking process (5.75 out of 7) and transparency about monetary policy objectives (2.5 out of 3). Practical implications. The enhancement of the NBU’s transparency level reflects the development of its communication policy as transparency of monetary policy requires constant and coherent messages via diversified channels and instruments for a defined target audience, following a clear purpose of strategic communication. Value/originality. It has been highlighted that central bank communication design is the basis for financial market participants' trust, favouring monetary policy transparency.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
4.80%
发文量
26
审稿时长
28 days
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