MAC-Keccak的边信道分析

2013 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) Pub Date : 2013-06-02 DOI:10.1109/HST.2013.6581577

Mostafa M. I. Taha, P. Schaumont

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引用次数: 29

摘要

NIST最近完成了SHA-3竞赛，选择Keccak作为加密散列的新标准。在本文中，我们提出了一个全面的Keccak侧信道分析，当它与一个秘密密钥一起使用来生成消息认证码(MAC) (MAC-Keccak)时。我们的分析涵盖了算法的所有变化。我们证明了MAC-Keccak的侧信道电阻取决于所使用的密钥长度，并推导出最佳密钥长度为((n * rate) - 1)，其中(n∈[2:∞])和速率为Keccak输入块大小。最后，本文通过在32位Microblaze处理器上实现的针对MAC-Keccak的实际攻击来证明我们的侧信道分析的可行性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Side-Channel Analysis of MAC-Keccak

NIST recently completed the SHA-3 competition with the selection of Keccak as the new standard for crypto-graphic hashing. In this paper, we present a comprehensive Side-Channel Analysis of Keccak, when it is used with a secret key to generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC) (MAC-Keccak). Our analysis covers all the variations of the algorithm. We show that the side-channel resistance of the MAC-Keccak depends on the key-length used, and we derive the optimum key-length as ((n * rate) - 1), where (n ∈ [2 : ∞]) and rate is the Keccak input block size. Finally, the paper demonstrates the feasibility of our side-channel analysis with a practical attack against MAC-Keccak implemented on a 32-bit Microblaze processor.

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2013 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)

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