An Efficient Lightweight Authentication Scheme With Adaptive Resilience of Asynchronization Attacks for Wireless Sensor Networks

Until now, the pseudonym ID and one-time hash chain as the key technologies solve anonymous and forward secrecy properties, respectively, in lightweight authentication protocols for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) environment. However, both techniques have to face the limitation of asynchronization attack, which will cause the pseudonym ID and one-time hash chain value between participants to be loss of synchronization when the transmitted message is blocked. Most recently, a serial of lightweight anonymous authentication scheme with forward secrecy (LAASFS) have been built to resolve this problem. Unfortunately, they failed to handle this question satisfactorily. Besides, most of them are still vulnerable to smart card loss attack (SCLA). In this article, to address these issues and make more effective, we combine pseudonym ID, one-time hash chain and tag techniques to construct an LAASFS for WSNs environment. The proposed LAASFS can be adaptive resilience of asynchronization attacks. In addition, it is also able to resist a variety of known attacks like SCLA and wrong password login attack. Formal analyses are taken by BAN logic and ProVerif tool to demonstrate the security of properties of our LAASFS. Compared with several previous related schemes, the proposed LAASFS possesses obvious advantages in computation and communication costs.