权力下放与对政府的信任:乌克兰的准实验证据

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Helge Arends , Tymofii Brik , Benedikt Herrmann , Felix Roesel
{"title":"权力下放与对政府的信任:乌克兰的准实验证据","authors":"Helge Arends ,&nbsp;Tymofii Brik ,&nbsp;Benedikt Herrmann ,&nbsp;Felix Roesel","doi":"10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Can decentralization of political powers increase trust in government? We present quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine where political trust has been among the lowest levels worldwide. The national government devolved powers and resources to newly formed local governments (<em>hromadas</em>) between 2015 and 2020; this includes a substantial share of taxes on local incomes. We exploit local differences in the timing of the decentralization reform. Difference-in-differences estimations show that citizens in decentralized communities report more trust in local authorities and participate more often in local elections. The most likely mechanism is the democratic process of coming together to build new local communities. Local trust however does not spill over to trust in national institutions. The results may explain the strong role of <em>hromadas</em> in Ukraine’s resilience against the detrimental effects of the Russian invasion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48183,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Comparative Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000689/pdfft?md5=8722d12fea2057d27d7ddffdf033c4b5&pid=1-s2.0-S0147596723000689-main.pdf","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decentralization and trust in government: Quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine\",\"authors\":\"Helge Arends ,&nbsp;Tymofii Brik ,&nbsp;Benedikt Herrmann ,&nbsp;Felix Roesel\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Can decentralization of political powers increase trust in government? We present quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine where political trust has been among the lowest levels worldwide. The national government devolved powers and resources to newly formed local governments (<em>hromadas</em>) between 2015 and 2020; this includes a substantial share of taxes on local incomes. We exploit local differences in the timing of the decentralization reform. Difference-in-differences estimations show that citizens in decentralized communities report more trust in local authorities and participate more often in local elections. The most likely mechanism is the democratic process of coming together to build new local communities. Local trust however does not spill over to trust in national institutions. The results may explain the strong role of <em>hromadas</em> in Ukraine’s resilience against the detrimental effects of the Russian invasion.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48183,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Comparative Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000689/pdfft?md5=8722d12fea2057d27d7ddffdf033c4b5&pid=1-s2.0-S0147596723000689-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Comparative Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000689\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Comparative Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596723000689","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

政治权力下放能否增加对政府的信任?我们提供了乌克兰的准实验证据,该国的政治信任度一直处于全球最低水平。国家政府在 2015 年至 2020 年期间向新成立的地方政府(hromadas)下放了权力和资源,其中包括对地方收入征收的大部分税收。我们利用了地方在权力下放改革时间上的差异。差分估计结果显示,权力下放社区的公民对地方政府的信任度更高,参与地方选举的频率也更高。最有可能的机制是共同建设新地方社区的民主进程。然而,地方信任并没有延伸到对国家机构的信任。这些结果或许可以解释为什么 "hromadas "在乌克兰抵御俄罗斯入侵的不利影响方面发挥了强有力的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decentralization and trust in government: Quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine

Can decentralization of political powers increase trust in government? We present quasi-experimental evidence from Ukraine where political trust has been among the lowest levels worldwide. The national government devolved powers and resources to newly formed local governments (hromadas) between 2015 and 2020; this includes a substantial share of taxes on local incomes. We exploit local differences in the timing of the decentralization reform. Difference-in-differences estimations show that citizens in decentralized communities report more trust in local authorities and participate more often in local elections. The most likely mechanism is the democratic process of coming together to build new local communities. Local trust however does not spill over to trust in national institutions. The results may explain the strong role of hromadas in Ukraine’s resilience against the detrimental effects of the Russian invasion.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
66
审稿时长
45 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Comparative Economics is to lead the new orientations of research in comparative economics. Before 1989, the core of comparative economics was the comparison of economic systems with in particular the economic analysis of socialism in its different forms. In the last fifteen years, the main focus of interest of comparative economists has been the transition from socialism to capitalism.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信