Letters of seamen in the wars with France, 1793–1815

is well developed in this book. Amid so much to commend this reviewer might be permitted one grumble. The author’s predominating focus is on the great expeditions to mainland Europe. Apart from examination of the 1801 Egyptian expedition, the author’s analysis of long-distance and transoceanic expeditions is fairly brief – even on Egypt, there is little consideration of how the transports were obtained or their composition, and nothing on their condition and the need to repair them at Minorca and Malta on their way to their destination. More questions might have been asked about the nature of the transport contribution to Britain’s global military reach. Transports on distant stations were a valuable but fragile commodity which local commanders were reluctant to return to the Board. How were local transports obtained, on what terms, and how were they maintained at a distance from the main European repair facilities? Perhaps more might have been said by way of illustration on the expedition that captured Martinique in 1809 to add to his picture of that year as one of the best in the Transport Board’s history. The military commander of the Egyptian expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby, remarked as he was about to set out that ‘there are risks in a British warfare unknown in any other service’ (see TNA, WO 1/345, Abercromby to Dundas, 15 January 1801). The risks were those of amphibious warfare, frequently overlooked by politicians of the day and by many military historians since. One of the most crucial factors in managing those risks and sustaining British offensive operations throughout the world was the ability of the Board of Transport to provide the ships without which no expedition could succeed. Robert Sutcliffe’s book should be compulsory reading for anyone wishing to understand the fundamental basis of British expeditionary warfare in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Great War with France.