A / B合同

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20200732

G. Georgiadis, M. Powell

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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文旨在提高道德风险下激励契约经典理论的实际适用性。我们建立了一个条件，在这个条件下，激励合同的A/B测试提供的信息足以回答如何最好地改善现状激励合同的问题，给定了代理人的货币偏好的先验知识。我们使用delavigna和Pope(2018)对各种激励合同的研究数据来评估这一结果的实证相关性。最后，我们讨论了如何扩展我们的框架，以纳入经典理论之外的其他考虑因素。(凝胶d82, d86, d91)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A/B Contracts

This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent’s monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope’s (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory. (JEL D82, D86, D91)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.