绩效薪酬的承诺?核心公务员政策处方应谨慎的原因

IF 8.7 1区 经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Zahid Hasnain, Nick Manning, Jan H Pierskalla
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引用次数: 29

摘要

关于绩效薪酬(PRP),有大量的文献,反对者和支持者都持强烈的观点。本研究回顾了这些文献,根据不同的公共部门背景,特别是不同类型的公共部门工作,实证研究的质量和经济背景(发展中国家或经合组织环境)对现有证据进行了分类,目的是为发展中国家的政策制定者提炼有用的经验教训。审查的总体结果在这些背景类别中总体上是积极的。特别是,基于对公共部门同等工作的内部和外部有效性的简单评分方法的高质量研究的结果表明,与某种形式的奖金挂钩的明确绩效标准可以改善预期的服务结果,有时效果显著。这一证据主要涉及手工工作,如教学、医疗保健和税收管理,显然否定了(至少在短期内)行为经济学关于挤出内在激励的担忧。现有证据表明,如果政策制定者对设计敏感并对游戏风险保持警惕,那么PRP可能会导致发展中国家这些工作的绩效改善。然而,由于三个原因,很难从审查中得出关于PRP对公务员核心工作的影响的确切结论。首先,在这些组织背景下对PRP的研究很少。公务员制度高级行政人员的工作与许多私营部门的工作大不相同,其特点是任务复杂和难以衡量结果。第二,尽管一些研究表明,PRP甚至可以在发展中国家功能最失调的官僚机构中发挥作用,但很少有案例说明其有效性或经合组织以外的其他情况。最后,很少有研究长期跟踪PRP的影响,对工作人员行为的长期影响和调整提供的信息很少。作者的结论是,需要更多的实证研究来检验PRP对发展中国家核心公务员制度的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Promise of Performance Pay? Reasons for Caution in Policy Prescriptions in the Core Civil Service
There is a vast body of literature on performance-related pay (PRP), with strongly held views from opponents and proponents. This study reviews this literature, disaggregating the available evidence by the different public sector contexts, particularly the different types of public sector jobs, the quality of the empirical study, and the economic context (developing country or OECD settings), with the aim of distilling useful lessons for policymakers in developing countries. The overall findings of the review are generally positive across these contextual categories. In particular, the findings from high quality studies, based on a simple scoring method for internal and external validity, of PRP in public sector-equivalent jobs show that explicit performance standards linked to some form of bonus pay can improve the desired service outcomes, at times dramatically. This evidence primarily concerns craft jobs, such as teaching, health care, and revenue administration, apparently negating (at least in the short term) the behavioral economics concern about the crowding out of intrinsic incentives. The available evidence suggests that if policymakers are sensitive to design and vigilant about the risks of gaming, then PRP may result in performance improvements in these jobs in developing countries. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the review about the effect of PRP in core civil service jobs for three reasons. First, there are very few studies of PRP in these organizational contexts. The work of senior administrators in the civil service is very different from that of many private sector jobs and is characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Second, although some studies have shown that PRP can work in even the most dysfunctional bureaucracies in developing countries, there are few cases illustrating its effectiveness or otherwise outside OECD settings. Finally, few studies follow PRP effects over time, providing little information on long-term effects and adjustments in staff behavior. The authors conclude that more empirical research is needed to examine the effects of PRP in the core civil service in developing countries.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
12.60
自引率
1.20%
发文量
8
期刊介绍: The World Bank Journals, including the Research Observer, boast the largest circulation among economics titles. The Research Observer is distributed freely to over 9,100 subscribers in non-OECD countries. Geared towards informing nonspecialist readers about research within and outside the Bank, it covers areas of economics relevant for development policy. Intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists, and educators, its surveys and overviews require only minimal background in economic analysis. Articles are not sent to referees but are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, including distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has around 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.
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