坚守阵地的不合理性:关于自卫的博弈论

Pub Date : 2022-11-29 DOI:10.1515/mopp-2022-0007

C. Santana, Adam C. Smith, Kathryn Petrozzo, Derek Halm

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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国法律继续其历史趋势，即对那些以所谓的自卫为目的进行暴力行为的行为者越来越宽容。我们利用一些非正式的博弈论来说明为什么这在战略上是非理性的，并建议将“坚守阵地”之类的自卫理论退回到早期的历史先例，比如“撤退的责任”。

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The Irrationality of Stand Your Ground: Game Theory on Self-Defense

Abstract US law continues its historical trend of growing more permissive towards actors who engage in violent action in purported self-defense. We draw on some informal game theory to show why this is strategically irrational and suggest rolling back self-defense doctrines like stand your ground to earlier historical precedents like duty to retreat.

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