在部分垂直整合下对独家和非独家技术许可的激励

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Manchester School Pub Date : 2021-11-16 DOI:10.1111/manc.12387

Mariola Sánchez, José Antonio Belso-Martínez, María José López-Sánchez, Adrián Nerja

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在部分垂直整合存在的情况下，我们比较了独占许可和交叉许可的情形。为了做到这一点，提出了一个连续的双寡头垄断模型，两个技术所有者和两个公司在一个差异化的产品市场上竞争。每个技术所有者都在一家竞争公司中拥有股份，因此竞争也延伸到了上游的研发部门。因此，该模型代表了文献中通常分析的混合情况。我们探讨了创新规模和垂直整合程度对技术扩散的影响。在均衡状态下，专利持有人的决定可能不一致。

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Incentives to exclusive and non-exclusive technology licensing under partial vertical integration

In this paper, we compare the scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses under the existence of partial vertical integration. To do this, a successive duopoly model is proposed, with two technology owners and two firms competing in a differentiated product market. Each technology owner has a share in one of the competing firms, so that competition is also extended to the upstream R&D sector. Thus, this model represents a mixed case to what is normally analyzed in the literature. We explore the implications of the size of innovation and the degree of vertical integration in technology diffusion. In equilibrium, patent holders’ decisions might not be aligned.

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来源期刊

Manchester School ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Manchester School was first published more than seventy years ago and has become a distinguished, internationally recognised, general economics journal. The Manchester School publishes high-quality research covering all areas of the economics discipline, although the editors particularly encourage original contributions, or authoritative surveys, in the fields of microeconomics (including industrial organisation and game theory), macroeconomics, econometrics (both theory and applied) and labour economics.