{"title":"基于博弈论的工程监理寻租行为分析","authors":"Zheng Shurong, Peng Miao","doi":"10.1016/j.sepro.2012.01.010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101207,"journal":{"name":"Systems Engineering Procedia","volume":"4 ","pages":"Pages 455-459"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.sepro.2012.01.010","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rent-seeking Behaviors analysis in Engineering Supervision based on the Game Theory\",\"authors\":\"Zheng Shurong, Peng Miao\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.sepro.2012.01.010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101207,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Systems Engineering Procedia\",\"volume\":\"4 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 455-459\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.sepro.2012.01.010\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Systems Engineering Procedia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221138191200032X\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Systems Engineering Procedia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221138191200032X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Rent-seeking Behaviors analysis in Engineering Supervision based on the Game Theory
Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.
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