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引用次数: 1
摘要
本文讨论了埃里克·波斯纳(Eric Posner)的著作《法律与社会规范》(Law and Social norm),重点讨论了波斯纳的规范遵守理论,即规范遵守是个体贴现率的一个昂贵信号。对贴现率和一系列广泛的社会困境的关注,使这本书成为关于社会规范的法律和经济学文献的一个受欢迎的补充。然而,这篇文章质疑昂贵的信号是否像波斯纳所主张的那样经常解决社会困境,并确定了该理论必须解决的几个经验难题。一个是种族歧视,坚持传统的性别角色,参与示威和其他群众行动,理论认为每一个都是低折现率的信号,似乎在折现率相对较高的个人中更为普遍。其他的谜题是在讨论羞辱惩罚时发展起来的,这是波斯纳用来说明信号理论的例子之一。
This essay discusses Eric Posner's book Law and Social Norms, focusing on Posner's theory of norm adherence as a costly signal of an individual's discount rate. The attention to discount rates and a broad set of social dilemmas makes the book a welcome addition to the law and economics literature on social norms. The essay, however, questions whether costly signaling solves social dilemmas as frequently as Posner contends and identifies several empirical puzzles with which the theory must contend. One is that ethnic discrimination, adherence to traditional gender roles, and participation in demonstrations and other mass actions, each of which the theory suggests is used to signal a low discount rate, appear to be more prevalent among individuals with relatively high discount rates. Other puzzles are developed in a discussion of shaming punishments, one of the examples Posner uses to illustrate the signaling theory.