The military as a political actor in Russia: The cases of Moldova and Georgia

Was the Russian military intervention in Moldova and Georgia in 1992-95 an attempt by Moscow to regain the geopolitical space lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union as some scholars claim? What were the role and the interests of the Russian military in these two conflicts? It is argued here that there was no geopolitical design underlying the two interventions, since Russian foreign policy was/is characterised by a plurality of actors with no single institution able to work out and implement a political strategy. In a very illuminating publication on the situation in the former Soviet Union (FSU) today, Klaus Segbers poses the fundamental question whether there is any sense in focusing analysis of the great transformations under way in the former Soviet Union on "high politics", that is, on presidents and their declarations of intent, on parties, parliaments and administrations, on elections and constitutions, "when states are not functioning properly, when identities are unclear. . . [I]t seems to be a good idea to return to some basic questions: if the state is not the only relevant actor and category of analysis, what territories, actors, groups and behaviours do really matter?“ The foreign policy decision-making process reflects the "pluralistic chaos" of social, economic and political transformation in Russia. Russian foreign policy and even the Russian military is characterised by a multiplicity of actors and a proliferation of institutions, which has voided them of any meaning. There is a panoply of organs with almost identical functions and a variety of actors, with no mechanisms to coordinate or control them.