记住mancur olson教授

Q3 Social Sciences
Decyzje Pub Date : 2015-12-15 DOI:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.53
Jong-Seong An
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引用次数: 0

摘要

不出所料,奥尔森教授的第一节课讲的是集体行动的逻辑,他从利益集团的经济利益出发,讨论了利益集团的形成和行为。当利益集团通过采取集体行动获得的利益超过采取行动的成本时,就会产生利益集团。而成本则由该利益集团的成员分担。在一个小团体中,成员能够观察到彼此的行动和行为。如果一个成员拒绝支付他的成本份额,这将对其他成员产生负面影响,甚至可能破坏群体的集体行动。因此,参加小利益集团的成员通常有义务支付他们的费用份额,以便继续参与集体行动。然而,随着团体规模的扩大,成员们越来越容易享受搭便车的乐趣。从一个大群体中只支付一小部分总成本的个人的角度来看,似乎这个群体的集体行动可以继续下去,即使他或她没有支付他们的份额——只要其他成员继续支付他们的份额。因此,大群体中的个人可能会倾向于从群体的集体行动中获益,而不为此付出代价。但是,一旦这些自私自利的成员数量增加,这个团体就不可能支持自己和它的行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
REMEMBERING PROFESSOR MANCUR OLSON
Professor Olson’s first lecture, predictably, was on the logic of collective action, and he talked about the formation and behavior of interest groups in the light of their economic interests. An interest group arises when the benefits it can derive by taking collective action outweigh the cost of taking that action. The cost, in turn, is shared among the members of that interest group. In a small group, members are able to observe the actions and behavior of one another. If one member refuses to pay his share of the cost, it will have a negative impact on other members and might even undermine the group’s collective action. Therefore, members participating in small interest groups are usually obliged to pay their share of the cost in order to continue engaging in collective actions. As a group grows in size, however, it becomes increasingly easy for members to enjoy a free-ride. From the perspective of an individual in a large group who pays a tiny fraction of the total cost, it might appear that the group’s collective actions could continue even if he or she defaults on paying their share – as long as other members continue to pay theirs. So individuals in large groups might be tempted to benefit from their group’s collective actions without paying towards the cost. But once the number of these selfishly inclined members increase, it becomes impossible for the group to support itself and its actions.
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来源期刊
Decyzje
Decyzje Social Sciences-Law
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