Raoul Zamblé, Raymond Gbegbe, J.-M. Kadjo, O. Asseu, Pacôme Brou
{"title":"数字红利的动态频谱接入协议","authors":"Raoul Zamblé, Raymond Gbegbe, J.-M. Kadjo, O. Asseu, Pacôme Brou","doi":"10.4236/CS.2016.713340","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It is \nnot more and more, easy to satisfy the important and growing spectrum demands \nin the context of the static conventional policy spectrum allocation. \nTherefore, to find a suitable solution to this problem, we are to days \nobserving the apparition of flexible dynamic spectrum allocation methods. These \nmethods that ought to improve more significantly the spectrum use have gained \nmuch interest. In fact, the digital dividend due to the change-over from the \nanalog television to the digital terrestrial television must be efficiently used. \nSo the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) can potentially play a key role in shaping \nthe future digital dividend use. In the DSA, two kinds of users or networks \ncoexist on different channels. The first one, known as the primary user, \naccesses to a channel with high priority; and the second one, known as \nsecondary user has a low priority. This paper presents a dynamic spectrum \naccess protocol based on an auction framework. Our protocol is an interesting \ntool that allows the networks to bid and obtain on the available spectrum, the \nrights to be primary and secondary users according their valuations and traffic \nneeds. Based on certain offers, our protocol selects primary and secondary \nusers for each idle channel in order to realize the maximum economic for the \nregulator or social benefits. We deal with the case in which the offers of the \nnetworks are independent one another even if they will share the same channels. \nWe design an algorithm in accordance with our dynamic spectrum access protocol. \nThe algorithm is used here to find an optimal solution to the access allocation \nproblem, specifically to digital dividend. Finally, the results in the numeric \nsection, regarding the three suggested scenarios, show that the proposed \ndynamic spectrum access protocol is viable. The algorithm is able to eliminate \nall non-compliant bidders for the available spectrum sharing. We notice that \nthe revenue or social benefits of the regulator is maximized when we have on \neach channel, one primary user and the maximum number of secondary users.","PeriodicalId":63422,"journal":{"name":"电路与系统(英文)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dynamic Spectrum Access Protocol for the Digital Dividend\",\"authors\":\"Raoul Zamblé, Raymond Gbegbe, J.-M. Kadjo, O. Asseu, Pacôme Brou\",\"doi\":\"10.4236/CS.2016.713340\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It is \\nnot more and more, easy to satisfy the important and growing spectrum demands \\nin the context of the static conventional policy spectrum allocation. \\nTherefore, to find a suitable solution to this problem, we are to days \\nobserving the apparition of flexible dynamic spectrum allocation methods. These \\nmethods that ought to improve more significantly the spectrum use have gained \\nmuch interest. In fact, the digital dividend due to the change-over from the \\nanalog television to the digital terrestrial television must be efficiently used. \\nSo the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) can potentially play a key role in shaping \\nthe future digital dividend use. In the DSA, two kinds of users or networks \\ncoexist on different channels. The first one, known as the primary user, \\naccesses to a channel with high priority; and the second one, known as \\nsecondary user has a low priority. This paper presents a dynamic spectrum \\naccess protocol based on an auction framework. Our protocol is an interesting \\ntool that allows the networks to bid and obtain on the available spectrum, the \\nrights to be primary and secondary users according their valuations and traffic \\nneeds. Based on certain offers, our protocol selects primary and secondary \\nusers for each idle channel in order to realize the maximum economic for the \\nregulator or social benefits. We deal with the case in which the offers of the \\nnetworks are independent one another even if they will share the same channels. \\nWe design an algorithm in accordance with our dynamic spectrum access protocol. \\nThe algorithm is used here to find an optimal solution to the access allocation \\nproblem, specifically to digital dividend. Finally, the results in the numeric \\nsection, regarding the three suggested scenarios, show that the proposed \\ndynamic spectrum access protocol is viable. The algorithm is able to eliminate \\nall non-compliant bidders for the available spectrum sharing. 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Dynamic Spectrum Access Protocol for the Digital Dividend
It is
not more and more, easy to satisfy the important and growing spectrum demands
in the context of the static conventional policy spectrum allocation.
Therefore, to find a suitable solution to this problem, we are to days
observing the apparition of flexible dynamic spectrum allocation methods. These
methods that ought to improve more significantly the spectrum use have gained
much interest. In fact, the digital dividend due to the change-over from the
analog television to the digital terrestrial television must be efficiently used.
So the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) can potentially play a key role in shaping
the future digital dividend use. In the DSA, two kinds of users or networks
coexist on different channels. The first one, known as the primary user,
accesses to a channel with high priority; and the second one, known as
secondary user has a low priority. This paper presents a dynamic spectrum
access protocol based on an auction framework. Our protocol is an interesting
tool that allows the networks to bid and obtain on the available spectrum, the
rights to be primary and secondary users according their valuations and traffic
needs. Based on certain offers, our protocol selects primary and secondary
users for each idle channel in order to realize the maximum economic for the
regulator or social benefits. We deal with the case in which the offers of the
networks are independent one another even if they will share the same channels.
We design an algorithm in accordance with our dynamic spectrum access protocol.
The algorithm is used here to find an optimal solution to the access allocation
problem, specifically to digital dividend. Finally, the results in the numeric
section, regarding the three suggested scenarios, show that the proposed
dynamic spectrum access protocol is viable. The algorithm is able to eliminate
all non-compliant bidders for the available spectrum sharing. We notice that
the revenue or social benefits of the regulator is maximized when we have on
each channel, one primary user and the maximum number of secondary users.