{"title":"一开始是实践","authors":"Ron Naiweld","doi":"10.4000/yod.669","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the main characteristics of rabbinic ethics is that it does not presuppose that a perfect knowledge of the truth is necessary to the practice of good. In this it differs from other ethical discourses, Christian or philosophical, of the Greco-Roman world. By studying this particularity of the rabbinical ethics, the present article tries to answer the following question: If knowledge of the “truth” does not lead to the practice of the “good”, how does rabbinic discourse articulates a motivation of the application of the law on an individual level?","PeriodicalId":53276,"journal":{"name":"Yod","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Au commencement était la pratique\",\"authors\":\"Ron Naiweld\",\"doi\":\"10.4000/yod.669\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One of the main characteristics of rabbinic ethics is that it does not presuppose that a perfect knowledge of the truth is necessary to the practice of good. In this it differs from other ethical discourses, Christian or philosophical, of the Greco-Roman world. By studying this particularity of the rabbinical ethics, the present article tries to answer the following question: If knowledge of the “truth” does not lead to the practice of the “good”, how does rabbinic discourse articulates a motivation of the application of the law on an individual level?\",\"PeriodicalId\":53276,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Yod\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Yod\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4000/yod.669\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Yod","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4000/yod.669","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the main characteristics of rabbinic ethics is that it does not presuppose that a perfect knowledge of the truth is necessary to the practice of good. In this it differs from other ethical discourses, Christian or philosophical, of the Greco-Roman world. By studying this particularity of the rabbinical ethics, the present article tries to answer the following question: If knowledge of the “truth” does not lead to the practice of the “good”, how does rabbinic discourse articulates a motivation of the application of the law on an individual level?
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