营销网络差异性与差异性Stackelberg博弈中的最优资源配置

IF 1.1 Q3 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.3934/jdg.2020009

A. Korolev, G. Ougolnitsky

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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们考虑了营销网络中意见控制的差分和差分Stackelberg博弈论模型。假设在网络分析阶段，网络的意见领袖已经被发现，并且是唯一的控制对象。领导者通过资源分配来决定追随者的营销预算。在模型的基本版本中，领导者和追随者都最大化了网络代理的总结意见。在第二个版本中，领导者有一个总结意见的目标值。在所有四个模型中，我们都分析地找到了Stackelberg均衡和参与者各自的收益。结果表明，该分级控制系统在所有情况下都具有理想的兼容性。

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Optimal resource allocation in the difference and differential Stackelberg games on marketing networks

We consider difference and differential Stackelberg game theoretic models with several followers of opinion control in marketing networks. It is assumed that in the stage of analysis of the network its opinion leaders have already been found and are the only objects of control. The leading player determines the marketing budgets of the followers by resource allocation. In the basic version of the models both the leader and the followers maximize the summary opinions of the network agents. In the second version the leader has a target value of the summary opinion. In all four models we have found the Stackelberg equilibrium and the respective payoffs of the players analytically. It is shown that the hierarchical control system is ideally compatible in all cases.

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来源期刊

Journal of Dynamics and Games MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

2.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is a pure and applied mathematical journal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papers in all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus of JDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory.