需求信息不对称条件下收益共享契约的概率审计

IF 1.3 Q3 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
J. Bhattacharyya, R. Marathe, G. Srinivasan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究了一个由供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链,该供应链采用收益共享契约进行协调。供应商仅从零售商在每个决策期结束时提交的销售报告中了解已实现的需求。掌握了市场需求的私人信息,零售商就可以少报销售额。为了避免少报造成的收入损失,供应商使用审计概率来检查零售商的不诚实行为。与设计供应商从零售商那里获取私人信息的机制(这在文献中已被主要讨论)不同,本研究提出了一种策略,在该策略中,参与者可以提高他们的预期利润,而不是当零售商不得不披露真实信息时他们将获得的利润。我们的研究发现,供应商受益于零售商的不诚实行为,只要在概率审计过程的帮助下,不诚实行为受到限制。在我们提出的政策中,双方参与者的预期利润都高于他们在诱导真相政策下的预期利润。这些发现表明,未来的研究将重点放在实现社会福利上,而不仅仅是关注诱导真相的机制。对优化问题进行数值分析,求出最优审计概率。我们的研究结果将帮助供应企业的管理者在不进行审计就无法观察到零售商收入的情况下设计收益分享合同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Probabilistic Audit in a Revenue Sharing Contract Under Asymmetric Demand Information
A two-echelon supply chain comprising a supplier and a retailer, coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract has been studied. The supplier knows the realized demand only from a sales report submitted by the retailer at the end of each decision period. Possession of private information about the market demand allows the retailer to under-report sales. To protect revenue loss from this under-reporting, the supplier uses audit probabilistically to check the retailer’s dishonesty. Unlike designing a mechanism for the supplier to elicit private information from the retailer, which has been predominantly discussed in the literature, this study proposes a policy where the players can improve their expected profit compared to what they would have earned when the retailer had to reveal truthful information. Our study finds that the supplier benefits from the retailer’s dishonesty, provided dishonesty is limited with the help of a probabilistic audit process. Both players' expected profits are higher in our proposed policy than what they would earn under a truth-inducing policy. These findings suggest that future studies focus on achieving social welfare instead of concentrating only on truth-inducing mechanisms. A numerical analysis of the optimization problem is performed to find the optimal audit probability. Our results will help a manager in a supplying firm design a revenue-sharing contract when she cannot observe her retailer’s revenue without an audit.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
6.20%
发文量
57
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: IJMEMS is a peer reviewed international journal aiming on both the theoretical and practical aspects of mathematical, engineering and management sciences. The original, not-previously published, research manuscripts on topics such as the following (but not limited to) will be considered for publication: *Mathematical Sciences- applied mathematics and allied fields, operations research, mathematical statistics. *Engineering Sciences- computer science engineering, mechanical engineering, information technology engineering, civil engineering, aeronautical engineering, industrial engineering, systems engineering, reliability engineering, production engineering. *Management Sciences- engineering management, risk management, business models, supply chain management.
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