平行的规范现实:塞尔维亚的腐败和裙带关系的非正式秩序

IF 0.3 Q4 SOCIOLOGY
Sociologija Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.2298/soc2204519v
Danilo Vuković, Bojan Spaić
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在当代塞尔维亚,政治和经济精英有组织地违法而不受惩罚。本文运用法学、社会学和政治学的理论和数据来解释这一现象。当代塞尔维亚官员的行为可以通过分析国家法律和非正式规范之间复杂的相互作用来解释,这些规范源于非正式的裙带关系和腐败制度。这些规范形成了一个平行的规范秩序(1),由对他人行为的相互期望和不遵守这些期望的后果组成。(2)它以社会和政治力量为基础,强化了非正式制度和规范秩序。(3)这一秩序的规范规范了行动者的行为,(4)它们是相互协调的,忠诚规范是规范秩序的核心。(5)平行规范体系为尊重非正式规则的政治和经济行为者暂停国家法律,同时利用国家法律的机制、规则和资源来制裁违反非正式规范的行为,这些行为被认为对维持非正式秩序至关重要。正式的国家法律与非正式的规范秩序之间的关系是一种冲突、竞争和寄生的关系。为了详细阐述这些发现,我们解释了非正式规则、制度和秩序的概念,并对它们之间关系的类型学进行了阐述和分析。然后,我们提出并分析了有关塞尔维亚腐败和裙带关系的实证研究数据。最后,根据理论框架和现有数据,我们得出结论,有充分的证据表明,塞尔维亚建立并维持了平行的规范秩序。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Parallel normative reality: The informal order of corruption and clientelism in Serbia
In contemporary Serbia, political and economic elite members systematically break the law with impunity. The paper explains this phenomenon by relying on theory and data from legal theory, sociology, and political science. The behaviour of officials in contemporary Serbia can be explained by analysing complex interactions between state law and informal norms that arise from informal institutions of clientelism and corruption. These norms form a parallel normative order (1) composed of mutual expectations regarding the behaviour of others and consequences for not complying with these expectations. (2) It is based on social and political powers that strengthen informal institutions and the normative order. (3) Norms of this order regulate the behaviour of actors, and (4) they are mutually harmonised, with the norm of loyalty central to the normative order. (5) The parallel normative system suspends state law for political and economic actors who respect informal rules while using mechanisms, rules, and resources of state law to sanction violations of informal norms that are considered crucial for maintaining the informal order. The relation between formal state law and the informal normative order is one of conflict, competition, and parasitisation. To elaborate on these findings, we explain the concepts of informal rules, institutions, and orders, along with an exposition and analysis of typologies of their relations. We then present and analyse empirical research data about corruption and clientelism in Serbia. Finally, based on the theoretical framework and the available data, we conclude that there is ample evidence that a parallel normative order is established and sustained in Serbia.
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来源期刊
Sociologija
Sociologija SOCIOLOGY-
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
12
审稿时长
40 weeks
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