{"title":"平行的规范现实:塞尔维亚的腐败和裙带关系的非正式秩序","authors":"Danilo Vuković, Bojan Spaić","doi":"10.2298/soc2204519v","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In contemporary Serbia, political and economic elite members systematically break the law with impunity. The paper explains this phenomenon by relying on theory and data from legal theory, sociology, and political science. The behaviour of officials in contemporary Serbia can be explained by analysing complex interactions between state law and informal norms that arise from informal institutions of clientelism and corruption. These norms form a parallel normative order (1) composed of mutual expectations regarding the behaviour of others and consequences for not complying with these expectations. (2) It is based on social and political powers that strengthen informal institutions and the normative order. (3) Norms of this order regulate the behaviour of actors, and (4) they are mutually harmonised, with the norm of loyalty central to the normative order. (5) The parallel normative system suspends state law for political and economic actors who respect informal rules while using mechanisms, rules, and resources of state law to sanction violations of informal norms that are considered crucial for maintaining the informal order. The relation between formal state law and the informal normative order is one of conflict, competition, and parasitisation. To elaborate on these findings, we explain the concepts of informal rules, institutions, and orders, along with an exposition and analysis of typologies of their relations. We then present and analyse empirical research data about corruption and clientelism in Serbia. Finally, based on the theoretical framework and the available data, we conclude that there is ample evidence that a parallel normative order is established and sustained in Serbia.","PeriodicalId":43515,"journal":{"name":"Sociologija","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Parallel normative reality: The informal order of corruption and clientelism in Serbia\",\"authors\":\"Danilo Vuković, Bojan Spaić\",\"doi\":\"10.2298/soc2204519v\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In contemporary Serbia, political and economic elite members systematically break the law with impunity. The paper explains this phenomenon by relying on theory and data from legal theory, sociology, and political science. The behaviour of officials in contemporary Serbia can be explained by analysing complex interactions between state law and informal norms that arise from informal institutions of clientelism and corruption. These norms form a parallel normative order (1) composed of mutual expectations regarding the behaviour of others and consequences for not complying with these expectations. (2) It is based on social and political powers that strengthen informal institutions and the normative order. (3) Norms of this order regulate the behaviour of actors, and (4) they are mutually harmonised, with the norm of loyalty central to the normative order. (5) The parallel normative system suspends state law for political and economic actors who respect informal rules while using mechanisms, rules, and resources of state law to sanction violations of informal norms that are considered crucial for maintaining the informal order. The relation between formal state law and the informal normative order is one of conflict, competition, and parasitisation. To elaborate on these findings, we explain the concepts of informal rules, institutions, and orders, along with an exposition and analysis of typologies of their relations. We then present and analyse empirical research data about corruption and clientelism in Serbia. Finally, based on the theoretical framework and the available data, we conclude that there is ample evidence that a parallel normative order is established and sustained in Serbia.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Sociologija\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Sociologija\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2298/soc2204519v\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Sociologija","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2298/soc2204519v","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"SOCIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Parallel normative reality: The informal order of corruption and clientelism in Serbia
In contemporary Serbia, political and economic elite members systematically break the law with impunity. The paper explains this phenomenon by relying on theory and data from legal theory, sociology, and political science. The behaviour of officials in contemporary Serbia can be explained by analysing complex interactions between state law and informal norms that arise from informal institutions of clientelism and corruption. These norms form a parallel normative order (1) composed of mutual expectations regarding the behaviour of others and consequences for not complying with these expectations. (2) It is based on social and political powers that strengthen informal institutions and the normative order. (3) Norms of this order regulate the behaviour of actors, and (4) they are mutually harmonised, with the norm of loyalty central to the normative order. (5) The parallel normative system suspends state law for political and economic actors who respect informal rules while using mechanisms, rules, and resources of state law to sanction violations of informal norms that are considered crucial for maintaining the informal order. The relation between formal state law and the informal normative order is one of conflict, competition, and parasitisation. To elaborate on these findings, we explain the concepts of informal rules, institutions, and orders, along with an exposition and analysis of typologies of their relations. We then present and analyse empirical research data about corruption and clientelism in Serbia. Finally, based on the theoretical framework and the available data, we conclude that there is ample evidence that a parallel normative order is established and sustained in Serbia.