打造全国冠军:铁路运输的国际竞争与分拆

IF 0.9 4区 工程技术 Q3 ECONOMICS
Steffen Juranek
{"title":"打造全国冠军:铁路运输的国际竞争与分拆","authors":"Steffen Juranek","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1918407","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the incentives to unbundle operations and infrastructure in the railway industry in a two-country model from the viewpoint of national governments. The analysis shows that the decision to unbundle institutionally or organisationally with separated accounts depends crucially on the importance of cross-border transportation. If cross-border transportation is sufficiently important, national governments choose accounting separation. However, for low-efficiency gains within a bundled firm, national governments are stuck in a Prisoner's Dilemma and would be better off coordinating on institutional separation. This result justifies major policy initiatives of the European Union and explains the behaviour of national governments. © 2016 LSE and the University of Bath","PeriodicalId":47475,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","volume":"50 1","pages":"56-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2015-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1918407","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Creating a National Champion: International Competition and Unbundling in Rail Transportation\",\"authors\":\"Steffen Juranek\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1918407\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article investigates the incentives to unbundle operations and infrastructure in the railway industry in a two-country model from the viewpoint of national governments. The analysis shows that the decision to unbundle institutionally or organisationally with separated accounts depends crucially on the importance of cross-border transportation. If cross-border transportation is sufficiently important, national governments choose accounting separation. However, for low-efficiency gains within a bundled firm, national governments are stuck in a Prisoner's Dilemma and would be better off coordinating on institutional separation. This result justifies major policy initiatives of the European Union and explains the behaviour of national governments. © 2016 LSE and the University of Bath\",\"PeriodicalId\":47475,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"56-75\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-06-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1918407\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1918407\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Transport Economics and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1918407","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文从国家政府的角度出发,研究了两国模式下铁路运营与基础设施分拆的激励机制。分析表明,是否要在制度上或组织上将账户分开,关键取决于跨境运输的重要性。如果跨境运输足够重要,各国政府会选择会计分离。然而,对于合并后企业的低效率收益而言,各国政府陷入了囚徒困境,最好在机构分离问题上进行协调。这一结果为欧盟的主要政策举措提供了理由,并解释了各国政府的行为。©2016伦敦经济学院和巴斯大学
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Creating a National Champion: International Competition and Unbundling in Rail Transportation
This article investigates the incentives to unbundle operations and infrastructure in the railway industry in a two-country model from the viewpoint of national governments. The analysis shows that the decision to unbundle institutionally or organisationally with separated accounts depends crucially on the importance of cross-border transportation. If cross-border transportation is sufficiently important, national governments choose accounting separation. However, for low-efficiency gains within a bundled firm, national governments are stuck in a Prisoner's Dilemma and would be better off coordinating on institutional separation. This result justifies major policy initiatives of the European Union and explains the behaviour of national governments. © 2016 LSE and the University of Bath
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy (JTEP) was first published over 40 years ago and quickly established itself as an essential source of information and debate on the economics of transport and its interface with transport policy. Today it continues to provide a much-needed focus for this specific area of transport research ­ a single, accessible resource of international articles which also reflect the diverse nature of the current field. JTEP meets the challenge of innovation and change, regularly publishing the latest policy developments and their impact across the world.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信