“人民的友谊”:公民参与环境执法

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
M. Seidenfeld
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引用次数: 3

摘要

在公民参与环境执法和机构自由裁量权之间选择威慑和合作执法方法之间的最佳平衡之间存在紧张关系。公民参与可以降低监督违法行为及其影响的成本,还可以减轻起诉违法者的负担。合作执法还可以通过鼓励受监管实体提供关于其监管绩效的信息来降低监测成本,还可以降低这些实体的合规成本,并将合规重点放在对社会造成净损害的违规行为上。然而,合作执法本身必须受到监督,以确保该机构不会滥用根据这种方法授予它的自由裁量权。然而,在某种程度上,公民参与威胁到合作执法的有效使用。尽管在合作执法模式下,公民参与提供了一种控制机构滥用的机制,但这种参与也使受监管的实体感到害怕,因为它们有权采取不合理的立场,因此阻碍了公司自我报告违规行为,也阻碍了公司坦率地说明如何使其工厂符合监管要求。本文提出了三种方法来缓解这种紧张关系,从而抓住公民参与和平衡的执法模式的好处。这篇文章表明,虽然这三种方法-三方主义、社团主义和协商参与-中的每一种都有一些希望,但每一种方法也都引起了严重的关切,使其无法成为实施参与监管执法的主要手段。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
'The Friendship of the People': Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement
There is a tension between citizen participation in environmental enforcement and an agency's discretion to choose the optimal balance between deterrence and cooperative approaches to enforcement. Citizen participation can reduce the costs of monitoring violations and their impacts and can pick up some of the burden of prosecuting violators. Cooperative enforcement can also reduce monitoring costs by encouraging regulated entities to provide information on their regulatory performance and can decrease those entities costs of compliance, as well focusing compliance on violations that cause net harm to the society. Cooperative enforcement, however, itself must be monitored to make sure that the agency does not abuse the discretion granted to it under this approach. At some level, however, citizen participation threatens effective use of cooperative enforcement. Although citizen participation provides a mechanism for controlling agency abuse under the cooperative enforcement model, such participation also scares regulated entities by empowering them to take unreasonable stands, and hence discourages companies from self reporting violations and acting candidly about what it will take to bring their plants into regulatory compliance. This article suggests three approaches to alleviate this tension and thereby capture the benefits of both citizen participation and a balanced model of enforcement. The article shows that although each of these three approaches - tripartism, corporatism and deliberative participation - holds some promise, each also raises significant concerns that prevent it from becoming the principal means of implementing participation in regulatory enforcement.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
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