{"title":"“随心所欲地相信是可能的”——真的是这样吗?对皮尔斯的“真理依赖于信念”案例和自愿性的一些评论","authors":"Claudio Cormick, Valeria Edelszten","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness\",\"authors\":\"Claudio Cormick, Valeria Edelszten\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling\",\"PeriodicalId\":42903,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manuscrito\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manuscrito\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manuscrito","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.cv","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness
: This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling