Emotionale Fähigkeiten in den (neo-)existenzialistischen Perspektiven von Sartre und Moran

Abstract The paper explores emotional abilities from the (neo-)existentialist perspectives of Jean-Paul Sartre and Richard Moran. First, it reconstructs Sartre’s understanding of emotions as active comportments achieving a magical transformation of the world. Second, it explores what existentialists mean by first-person authority: Regarding my own emotions, I cannot only explore what I feel, but I also need to ask myself what to feel. The claim is that my emotions depend on me committing to them. Third, I highlight a difference between a neo-existentialist account which focuses on reflective self-constitution, and a vintage existentialist approach which focuses on pre-reflective self-awareness. Forth, I point out that (neo-)existentialism helps to make explicit the normative claim which is implied when speaking of abilities regarding one’s emotions. The claim is that it is up to me to either endorse my emotions or to change who I am to feel differently. Finally, I indicate the limits of such an approach when it comes to social structures of inequality and domination.