成功需要能力吗?

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
NOUS Pub Date : 2021-06-24 DOI:10.1111/nous.12370
David Boylan
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引用次数: 3

摘要

想象一下,一个巨浪正在升起,我带着冲浪板冲进了海里。你对我一无所知,也许我是世界上最伟大的冲浪运动员之一;也许我是个傻瓜。你觉得我的能力怎么样,如果我乘着那股海浪冲上海岸?这意味着我能在那样的海浪上冲浪吗?成功需要能力吗?当我们专注于成功的行动时,成功是引人注目的。奥斯汀(Austin, 1961)说:“根据普通英语,仅仅从[一个高尔夫球手击入推杆]这个前提出发,他就有能力做到这一点。”事实上,当某人在某件事上取得成功时,比如推杆或冲浪,人们被迫承认他们有能力做到这一点。这就是成功带给我们的期待。但是,当成功尚未得到保证时,教训似乎就不同了。在事实之前说过,我可以在那个波浪上冲浪的说法是强有力的——它说在那个波浪上冲浪是在我的控制范围内。这种直觉,我们称之为控制直觉,会阻碍成功。仅仅做一件事并不能证明这件事在我的控制范围之内:运气确实会发生。所以,如果控制直觉是正确的,成功不应该展示能力。*感谢罗格斯语言研讨会的参与者,以及Fabrizio Cariani、Justin Khoo、Jeff King、Annina Loets、Matthew Mandelkern、Milo phillipsbrown、Robert Stalnaker和Barbara Vetter。特别感谢Ginger Schultheis对多个草稿的评论。我将专门关注成功是否对特定的能力属性有效,这关系到agent是否能够在特定的时间(通常是在未来)执行一个动作,比如现在举起200磅或者在这次投掷中击中靶心。这些是与一般或一般能力归属形成对比的,后者说的是一个主体有能力执行一个动作,不是在特定的时间,而是在一般情况下。Mandelkern等人(2017)认为,通用能力归属的语义是通过简单地在通用算子下嵌入特定的能力归属而派生的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
DOES success entail ability?
Imagine a great wave is rising and I have dashed into the sea with my surfboard. You know nothing about me: perhaps I am one of the world’s great surfers; perhaps I am a fool. What would it tell you about my abilities, if I were ride into the coast on that wave? Would it mean I am able to surf a wave like that? Does success entail ability? Call the principle that it does Success.1 When we focus on successful action, Success is compelling. Austin (1961) said that “it follows merely from the premise that [a golfer sinks a putt], that he has the ability to do it, according to ordinary English”. And indeed when someone succeeds in something, like sinking a putt or surfing a wave, one is forced to concede they were able to do that. This is what Success would lead us to expect. But when success is not yet assured, the lesson seems different. When said before the fact, the claim that I can surf that wave is strong — it says that surfing that wave is within my control. This intuition, call it the control intuition, drives against Success. Just doing something does not demonstrate it is within my control: flukes do happen. So, if the control intuition is right, success should not demonstrate ability. ∗Thanks to the participants of the Rutgers Language Workshop, and Fabrizio Cariani, Justin Khoo, Jeff King, Annina Loets, Matthew Mandelkern, Milo Phillips-Brown, Robert Stalnaker, and Barbara Vetter. Special thanks to Ginger Schultheis for comments on multiple drafts. 1I will focus exclusively on whether Success is valid for specific ability attributions which concern whether an agent is able to perform an action at a particular time (generally in the future), like lifting 200 pounds right now or hitting a bullseye on this throw. These are to be contrasted with general or generic ability ascriptions, which say that an agent has the ability to perform an action, not at a specific time, but rather in general. Mandelkern et al. (2017) argue that the semantics for generic ability ascriptions is derived by simply embedding a specific ability ascription under a generic operator.
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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