玛丽·谢泼德关于证明在我们的第一性原理知识中的作用

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
NOUS Pub Date : 2021-03-27 DOI:10.1111/NOUS.12365
M. Folescu
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文考察了理性在谢泼德通过第一原则获取外部世界知识的叙述中的作用。理性很重要,但并不具有基础性的作用。某些原则使我们能够得出获取外部世界知识所需的推论。这些原则是基本的,基础的,更重要的是,不言自明的,因此可以通过其他方式而不是通过论证来证明。对这些原则的论证既不需要,也不可能。通过引用文本和上下文证据,我将证明谢泼德应该说,我们知道任何科学的基本原理,一般来说,“一切开始存在的东西都必须有一个原因”,特别是通过直觉,而不是通过理性。对这些原则进行推理可以帮助它们在某些情况下表现出自明性;然而,它们的正当性,以及我们相信它们的正当性,并不是来自于这种推理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles
This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd’s account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self-evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self-evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however.
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来源期刊
NOUS
NOUS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
4.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Noûs, a premier philosophy journal, publishes articles that address the whole range of topics at the center of philosophical debate, as well as long critical studies of important books. Subscribers to Noûs also receive two prestigious annual publications at no additional cost: Philosophical Issues and Philosophical Perspectives.
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