{"title":"附带法律发现的或有费用","authors":"F. Baumann, Tim Friehe","doi":"10.1093/ALER/AHV020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.","PeriodicalId":46133,"journal":{"name":"American Law and Economics Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"155-175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contingent Fees with Legal Discovery\",\"authors\":\"F. Baumann, Tim Friehe\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ALER/AHV020\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46133,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Law and Economics Review\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"155-175\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ALER/AHV020\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Law and Economics Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV020\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Law and Economics Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ALER/AHV020","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between a plaintiff and her lawyer when the lawyer chooses the settlement offer and undertakes legal discovery. Our objective was to highlight the implications of discovery for the contingent-fee arrangement that is optimal for the plaintiff. We consider bifurcated contingent fees and show that the consideration of legal discovery attenuates the standard asymmetry between the contingent fee for a settlement and the contingent fee for a judgment. To obtain the maximal joint surplus of the plaintiff–lawyer pair, the arrangement must specify nonlinear contingent fees.
期刊介绍:
The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.