序贯诉讼中的审判激励

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2015-03-01 DOI:10.1093/ALER/AHU012

D. Bernhardt, F. Lee

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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们分析当被告可能面对未来的原告时，审判何时以及为什么会出现平衡。初审是一个实验，被告可以通过这个实验来诱导随后的潜在原告了解他们获胜的机会。当对被告有利的审判结果可以阻止潜在的未来原告提起诉讼时，最初的案件可能会进入审判阶段。未来可能发生的无法律依据的诉讼进一步提高了初审的吸引力。我们还得出了原告议价能力和未来原告主体异质性的影响。

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Trial incentives in sequential litigation

We analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may face future plaintiffs. An initial trial serves as an experiment that the defendant can run to induce subsequent potential plaintiffs to learn about their chances of winning. The initial case may go to trial when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Possible future meritless lawsuits further raise the attraction of an initial trial. We also derive the impact of the plaintiff's bargaining power and the heterogeneity in the body of future plaintiffs.

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来源期刊

American Law and Economics Review Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.