政治领导任命制是否影响地方财政分配?

IF 2.4 2区社会学 Q1 AREA STUDIES

Journal of Contemporary China Pub Date : 2022-09-20 DOI:10.1080/10670564.2022.2124354

Jin Yang, Yanhua Deng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本研究探讨省级权力集中对中国财政支出分配的影响。作者采用了一个准自然的实验环境，该环境是由2002年制定的一项规定形成的，该规定规定，一般来说，中国共产党省级书记应该被推荐为省级人民代表大会(PPC)主席候选人。对省级面板数据的实证分析发现，同时担任政协主席的党委书记不仅扩大了地方公共支出规模，而且还限制了支持社会福利和民生项目的财政支出，因为地方领导人倾向于更多地投资于可能产生短期经济增长的经济项目。此外，权力集中和国会权力受限会降低地方公共支出的效率。

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Does Concurrent Political Leadership Appointment Affect Local Fiscal Allocation in China?

ABSTRACT This study examines how power centralization at the provincial level affects the allocation of fiscal expenditures in China. The authors employ a quasi-natural experimental setting formed by a regulation established in 2002 stating that, in general, provincial Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretaries should be recommended as candidates for chairmen of the Provincial People’s Congress (PPC). An empirical analysis of provincial panel data finds that Party secretaries concurrently serving as PPC chairmen not only inflates the size of local public expenditures, but also limits fiscal expenditures supporting social welfare and livelihood programs due to a tendency among local leaders to invest more in economic programs that could generate short-term economic growth. Furthermore, power centralization and constrained congressional power could reduce the efficiency of local public expenditures.

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来源期刊

Journal of Contemporary China AREA STUDIES-

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Contemporary China is the only English language journal edited in North America that provides exclusive information about contemporary Chinese affairs for scholars, businessmen and government policy-makers. It publishes articles of theoretical and policy research and research notes, as well as book reviews. The journal"s fields of interest include economics, political science, law, culture, literature, business, history, international relations, sociology and other social sciences and humanities.