From The Gulf War to Global War on Terror -a distorted Sun Tzu in US strategic thinking?

DOI: 10.1080/03071840701863117 It is claimed that Sun Tzu’s precepts were applied in US strategy for both the First Gulf War and the ongoing Global War on Terror. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the US and coalition forces in the Gulf War, was a student of Sun Tzu and employed tactics from The Art ofWar to secure victory. In the latest war in Iraq and Afghanistan, former CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, was reported to be a devotee of Sun Tzu and often found quoting him. However, the results differ. The Gulf War was a short and victorious war while the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is long and hitherto inconclusive. This essay does not seek to judge the success of the GWOT, but rather understand why the results of the US application of Sun Tzu are so different, given McNeilly’s claim that Sun Tzu’s influence is growing in the US military amongst the higher-ranking officers, to the extent that an essay competition in Sun Tzu’s name has been inaugurated at the National Defense University. A simple answer would be that the Gulf War was a conventional war and fighting it using Sun Tzu’s indirect approach was sufficient to deliver an overwhelming victory, which Schwarzkopf did. However, the GWOT is an unconventional war against unseen enemies (terrorists) and hence the entire force needs to fully understand Sun Tzu in order to fight against the terrorists who are arguably also using the indirect approach. Therefore, it becomes a battle of hearts and minds and the side which is faster and more ‘indirect’ will emerge victorious. Even if Franks had internalized Sun Tzu, his subordinates might not have, and this could have been the weak link. However, this answer is simplistic. Based on wide reading of secondary literature and textual analysis of Sun Tzu-related articles in Military Review (MR), Naval Proceedings (NP) and Parameters (PA) between 1997 to June 2006, the author found the following insights to better understand the phenomenon. By analyzing the manner and the frequency of usage of Sun Tzu in each article, there is evidence that he was usually name-dropped and quoted to substantiate certain points and some misuse of quotes was observed. Sun Tzu is incorrectly engaged in other articles: for example, the maxim ‘know your enemy and yourself’ is often used to legitimize the Information Technology (IT) Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) where knowledge leads to victory. But Sun Tzu meant ‘foreknowledge’, or human intelligence of intentions, rather than merely technical information. Other articles misuse Sun Tzu’s phrase ‘to subdue without fighting’ to justify the IT RMA, overwhelming and precise firepower. Sun Tzu actually stated a preference for non-violence, skillful strategizing and psychological operations. In their correct engagements, there is evidence pointing towards articles inNaval Proceedings demonstrating a firmer grasp of Sun Tzu’s concepts though Parameters and Military Review also featured writers who truly understood Sun Tzu. Based on further reading on the US military and the various influences on its strategic thinking, this article concludes that Sun Tzu has been gradually distorted since the Gulf War through the shifting balance between the structural (strategic culture) and agential factors. CharlesChao Rong Phua holds degrees in International Relations from the LSE, and is also the LSEwinner of theGoldman Sachs Global Leaders Award in 2004 for academic and leadership excellence. He is currently a Captain in the SingaporeArmed Forces.The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the view of the SingaporeArmed Forces. From The GulfWar to GlobalWar on Terror – a distorted Sun Tzu in US strategic thinking?