我比你有更多的自由意志吗?个人自由直觉的意外不对称

B. Earp
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本研究探讨道德评价与人类行为原因直觉之间的关系,特别是意志自由。两项研究测试了自由意志直觉中的自我服务偏见。研究1探讨了个人是否会通过否认自由意志来为自己的错误行为开脱,同时通过支持自由意志来为指责他人辩护。研究2探讨了个人是否会通过否认自由意志来为个人失败辩护,同时通过认可自由意志来获得个人成功。在这两项研究中,数据都没有显示不同条件下的预测差异。然而,一个意想不到的发现被报道。通过汇集两个实验的数据,并在不同条件下进行分解,结果表明,无论从第一人称而不是第三人称的角度来描述行为,参与者都更支持自由意志——这是一种试试性的“我比你有更多的自由意志”效应。讨论了这些发现的可能解释,以及进一步研究该主题的途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do I Have More Free Will Than You Do? An Unexpected Asymmetry in Intuitions About Personal Freedom
The present research explores the relationship between moral evaluations and intuitions about the causes of human behavior, in particular freedom of the will. Two studies test for a self-serving bias in intuitions about free will. Study 1 explores whether individuals may seek to exculpate themselves from wrongdoing by denying free will, while justifying blame of others by endorsing free will. Study 2 explores whether individuals may justify personal failures by denying free will, while taking credit for personal successes by endorsing free will. In neither study do the data show the predicted differences between conditions. However, an unexpected finding is reported. By pooling the data from both experiments and collapsing across conditions, it is shown that participants give greater endorsement of free will whenever actions are described from a first-person, instead of third-person, perspective—a tentative “I have more free will than you do” effect. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed, as are avenues for further research on this topic.
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