{"title":"1900年前后德国物理学中的事实概念:马赫与爱因斯坦之比较","authors":"Elske de Waal, Sjang L. ten Hagen","doi":"10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The concept of “fact” has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein’s interpretations of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century German physicists, contrasted fact and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events. Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein’s concept of fact was incompatible with Mach’s, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too, just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.</p>","PeriodicalId":727,"journal":{"name":"Physics in Perspective","volume":"22 2","pages":"55 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Concept of Fact in German Physics around 1900: A Comparison between Mach and Einstein\",\"authors\":\"Elske de Waal, Sjang L. ten Hagen\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The concept of “fact” has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein’s interpretations of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century German physicists, contrasted fact and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events. Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein’s concept of fact was incompatible with Mach’s, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too, just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":727,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Physics in Perspective\",\"volume\":\"22 2\",\"pages\":\"55 - 80\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Physics in Perspective\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Physics in Perspective","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00016-020-00256-y","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Concept of Fact in German Physics around 1900: A Comparison between Mach and Einstein
The concept of “fact” has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein’s interpretations of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century German physicists, contrasted fact and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events. Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein’s concept of fact was incompatible with Mach’s, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too, just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.
期刊介绍:
Physics in Perspective seeks to bridge the gulf between physicists and non-physicists through historical and philosophical studies that typically display the unpredictable as well as the cross-disciplinary interplay of observation, experiment, and theory that has occurred over extended periods of time in academic, governmental, and industrial settings and in allied disciplines such as astrophysics, chemical physics, and geophysics. The journal also publishes first-person accounts by physicists of significant contributions they have made, biographical articles, book reviews, and guided tours of historical sites in cities throughout the world. It strives to make all articles understandable to a broad spectrum of readers – scientists, teachers, students, and the public at large. Bibliographic Data Phys. Perspect. 1 volume per year, 4 issues per volume approx. 500 pages per volume Format: 15.5 x 23.5cm ISSN 1422-6944 (print) ISSN 1422-6960 (electronic)