Alejandro Cohen;Rafael G. L. D'Oliveira;Chia-Yi Yeh;Hichem Guerboukha;Rabi Shrestha;Zhaoji Fang;Edward W. Knightly;Muriel Médard;Daniel M. Mittleman
{"title":"太赫兹无线链路的绝对安全性","authors":"Alejandro Cohen;Rafael G. L. D'Oliveira;Chia-Yi Yeh;Hichem Guerboukha;Rabi Shrestha;Zhaoji Fang;Edward W. Knightly;Muriel Médard;Daniel M. Mittleman","doi":"10.1109/JSTSP.2023.3307906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Security against eavesdropping is one of the key concerns in the design of any communication system. Many common considerations of the security of a wireless communication channel rely on comparing the signal level measured by Bob (the intended receiver) to that accessible to Eve (a single eavesdropper). Frameworks such as Wyner's wiretap model ensure the security of a link, in an average sense, when Bob's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exceeds Eve's. Unfortunately, because these guarantees rely on the noise realizations at Eve, statistically, Eve can still occasionally succeed in decoding information. The goal of achieving \n<italic>exactly zero</i>\n probability of intercept over an engineered region of the broadcast sector, which we term absolute security, remains elusive. Here, we describe the first architecture for a wireless link with a single eavesdropper, that provides absolute security. I.e., a cryptographic deterministic and non-probabilistic security approach that does not rely on statistical assumptions about noise, shared secure key, or Eve's computational power. Our approach relies on the inherent properties of broadband and high-gain antennas, and is therefore ideally suited for implementation in millimeter-wave and terahertz wireless systems, where such antennas will generally be employed. We exploit spatial minima of the antenna pattern at different frequencies, the union of which defines a wide region where Eve is guaranteed to fail regardless of her computational capabilities, and regardless of the noise in the channels. Unlike conventional zero-forcing beam forming methods, we show that, for realistic assumptions about the antenna configuration and power budget, this absolute security guarantee can be achieved over most possible eavesdropper locations. Since we use relatively simple frequency-multiplexed coding, together with the underlying physics of a diffracting aperture, this idea is broadly applicable in many contexts.","PeriodicalId":13038,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Absolute Security in Terahertz Wireless Links\",\"authors\":\"Alejandro Cohen;Rafael G. L. D'Oliveira;Chia-Yi Yeh;Hichem Guerboukha;Rabi Shrestha;Zhaoji Fang;Edward W. Knightly;Muriel Médard;Daniel M. Mittleman\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/JSTSP.2023.3307906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Security against eavesdropping is one of the key concerns in the design of any communication system. Many common considerations of the security of a wireless communication channel rely on comparing the signal level measured by Bob (the intended receiver) to that accessible to Eve (a single eavesdropper). Frameworks such as Wyner's wiretap model ensure the security of a link, in an average sense, when Bob's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exceeds Eve's. Unfortunately, because these guarantees rely on the noise realizations at Eve, statistically, Eve can still occasionally succeed in decoding information. The goal of achieving \\n<italic>exactly zero</i>\\n probability of intercept over an engineered region of the broadcast sector, which we term absolute security, remains elusive. Here, we describe the first architecture for a wireless link with a single eavesdropper, that provides absolute security. I.e., a cryptographic deterministic and non-probabilistic security approach that does not rely on statistical assumptions about noise, shared secure key, or Eve's computational power. Our approach relies on the inherent properties of broadband and high-gain antennas, and is therefore ideally suited for implementation in millimeter-wave and terahertz wireless systems, where such antennas will generally be employed. We exploit spatial minima of the antenna pattern at different frequencies, the union of which defines a wide region where Eve is guaranteed to fail regardless of her computational capabilities, and regardless of the noise in the channels. Unlike conventional zero-forcing beam forming methods, we show that, for realistic assumptions about the antenna configuration and power budget, this absolute security guarantee can be achieved over most possible eavesdropper locations. Since we use relatively simple frequency-multiplexed coding, together with the underlying physics of a diffracting aperture, this idea is broadly applicable in many contexts.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13038,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10227529/\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10227529/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
Security against eavesdropping is one of the key concerns in the design of any communication system. Many common considerations of the security of a wireless communication channel rely on comparing the signal level measured by Bob (the intended receiver) to that accessible to Eve (a single eavesdropper). Frameworks such as Wyner's wiretap model ensure the security of a link, in an average sense, when Bob's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) exceeds Eve's. Unfortunately, because these guarantees rely on the noise realizations at Eve, statistically, Eve can still occasionally succeed in decoding information. The goal of achieving
exactly zero
probability of intercept over an engineered region of the broadcast sector, which we term absolute security, remains elusive. Here, we describe the first architecture for a wireless link with a single eavesdropper, that provides absolute security. I.e., a cryptographic deterministic and non-probabilistic security approach that does not rely on statistical assumptions about noise, shared secure key, or Eve's computational power. Our approach relies on the inherent properties of broadband and high-gain antennas, and is therefore ideally suited for implementation in millimeter-wave and terahertz wireless systems, where such antennas will generally be employed. We exploit spatial minima of the antenna pattern at different frequencies, the union of which defines a wide region where Eve is guaranteed to fail regardless of her computational capabilities, and regardless of the noise in the channels. Unlike conventional zero-forcing beam forming methods, we show that, for realistic assumptions about the antenna configuration and power budget, this absolute security guarantee can be achieved over most possible eavesdropper locations. Since we use relatively simple frequency-multiplexed coding, together with the underlying physics of a diffracting aperture, this idea is broadly applicable in many contexts.
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing (JSTSP) focuses on the Field of Interest of the IEEE Signal Processing Society, which encompasses the theory and application of various signal processing techniques. These techniques include filtering, coding, transmitting, estimating, detecting, analyzing, recognizing, synthesizing, recording, and reproducing signals using digital or analog devices. The term "signal" covers a wide range of data types, including audio, video, speech, image, communication, geophysical, sonar, radar, medical, musical, and others.
The journal format allows for in-depth exploration of signal processing topics, enabling the Society to cover both established and emerging areas. This includes interdisciplinary fields such as biomedical engineering and language processing, as well as areas not traditionally associated with engineering.