审计法规是否改善了管理人员使用的基本信息?PCAOB检查访问和管理预测准确性的证据

IF 3.6 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Brant Christensen , Lijun (Gillian) Lei , Sydney Qing Shu , Wayne Thomas
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引用次数: 0

摘要

调查证据和学术研究表明,审计条例不仅会影响外部财务报告中的信息,还会影响管理层使用的内部信息。我们通过研究上市公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB)国际检查计划启动前后管理预测准确性的提高来调查这种可能性。与管理者改进信息的情况一致,我们发现管理者在PCAOB检查访问后发布了更准确的预测。多个额外的分析支持改进的信息环境是我们结果的基础机制,这种影响不同于PCAOB检查对外部报告质量的任何影响,并且是增量的。我们的研究提供了证据,证明审计监管有利于一个重要的内部利益相关者——管理者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does audit regulation improve the underlying information used by managers? Evidence from PCAOB inspection access and management forecast accuracy

Survey evidence and academic research raise the possibility that audit regulation can impact not only the information contained in external financial reports but also the internal information used by management. We investigate this possibility by examining the improvement in management forecast accuracy around initiation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) international inspection program. Consistent with managers having improved information, we find that managers issue more accurate forecasts following PCAOB inspection access. Multiple additional analyses support that an improved information environment is the mechanism underlying our results, and this effect is distinct from, and incremental to, any effects of PCAOB inspection on external reporting quality. Our study provides evidence that audit regulation benefits an important internal stakeholder—managers.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.40%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Accounting, Organizations & Society is a major international journal concerned with all aspects of the relationship between accounting and human behaviour, organizational structures and processes, and the changing social and political environment of the enterprise.
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