隐性担保与影子银行的兴起——以信托产品为例

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.04.012

Franklin Allen , Xian Gu , C. Wei Li , Jun “QJ” Qian , Yiming Qian

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引用次数: 0

摘要

金融中介机构提供的隐性担保是中国影子银行业的关键组成部分。我们从理论上表明，中介机构对项目进行筛选，并向投资者提供隐性担保，可能是第二好的安排，可以缓解有利于国有企业的资本错配。使用信托投资产品的数据集，我们发现，与我们的模型一致，事前预期收益率反映了借款人的风险和隐性担保强度，而强有力的担保降低了风险敏感性。2018年限制隐性担保的规定导致收益率差和担保强度之间的关系减弱，非国有企业的信贷配给增加。

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Implicit guarantees and the rise of shadow banking: The case of trust products

Implicit guarantees provided by financial intermediaries are a key component of China's shadow banking sector. We show theoretically that project screening by intermediaries, accompanied by their implicit guarantees to investors, can be the second-best arrangement and mitigate capital misallocation that favors state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a dataset of trusts’ investment products, we find, consistent with our model, that ex ante expected yields reflect borrower risks and implicit guarantee strength, and risk sensitivity is reduced by strong guarantees. Regulations in 2018 restricting implicit guarantees lead to a weaker relationship between yield spread and guarantee strength, and more credit rationing of non-SOEs.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.