战略行为的决定因素：止赎禁令的证据

IF 3.1 1区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101059

Nikolaos Artavanis , Ioannis Spyridopoulos

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了抵押人在希腊暂停止赎后对战略行为的态度。为了确定战略性拖欠，我们利用同时引入的债务清偿程序，为那些证明自己无力支付但又给那些有能力支付抵押贷款的人带来高昂成本的借款人提供慷慨的债务减免。这种设置为拖欠债务的借款人创造了独特的最佳策略：非战略抵押人参与债务清偿过程，而战略借款人则利用延期偿付来保护他们的房屋。我们的研究结果表明，借款人的成熟度、对道德风险的厌恶、银行关系和对流动性的偏好在战略行为中起着重要作用。

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Determinants of strategic behavior: Evidence from a foreclosure moratorium

We study mortgagors’ attitudes toward strategic behavior following a foreclosure moratorium in Greece. To identify strategic delinquencies, we exploit the concurrent introduction of a debt discharge process that provides generous debt relief for borrowers who prove their inability to pay but entails high costs for those who can afford their mortgages. This setting creates distinct optimal strategies for delinquent borrowers: non-strategic mortgagors participate in the debt discharge process, whereas strategic borrowers use the moratorium to protect their homes. Our results indicate that borrower sophistication, aversion to moral hazard, banking relationships, and preference for liquidity play an important role in strategic behavior.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Intermediation BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

8.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.