没有对抗主义的法家主义?:官僚法律主义与欧盟监管实施的政治

IF 3.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Chase Foster
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引用次数: 1

摘要

许多学者预测,欧洲一体化将在欧洲滋生对抗性的法律主义。在本文中,我通过研究欧盟在竞争和证券领域的监管任务,实证地评估了欧洲法律主义的论点,这两个政策领域被认为是最有可能发展对抗性法律主义的。我认为,对抗性法律主义在欧洲的扩散在欧盟政策制定过程中面临着重大的政治反对,这限制了欧盟二级立法中私人强制执行授权的使用。欧洲决策者更多地依靠公共监管机构的行政执法,这是一种更接近官僚法律主义的政策实施模式。在实践中,公共当局发挥着主要的执行作用,私人诉讼在公共执行行动之后起着较为狭隘的赔偿作用。根据制度主义理论,我确定了几个因素,这些因素鼓励了欧洲法律主义的官僚风格(而不是对抗性风格)的发展,尤其是成员国对程序辅助性的承诺,美国在企业诉讼方面的经验带来的负面反馈效应,以及欧洲法律和官僚传统的粘性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Legalism without adversarialism?: Bureaucratic legalism and the politics of regulatory implementation in the European Union
Many scholars predict that European integration will foster adversarial legalism in Europe. In this article, I empirically assess the Eurolegalism thesis by examining EU regulatory mandates in the competition and securities fields, two policy areas where adversarial legalism is seen as most likely to develop. I argue that the diffusion of adversarial legalism to Europe has faced significant political opposition in the EU policymaking process which has curtailed the use of private enforcement mandates in EU secondary legislation. European policymakers have relied more on administrative enforcement through public regulatory agencies, a mode of policy implementation closer to bureaucratic legalism. In practice, public authorities play the primary enforcement role and private litigation serves the narrower function of compensation following public enforcement actions. Drawing from institutionalist theory, I identify several factors that have encouraged the development of bureaucratic rather than adversarial styles of European legalism, especially member states' commitments to procedural subsidiarity, the negative feedback effects from the US experience with entrepreneurial litigation, and the stickiness of European legal and bureaucratic traditions.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Regulation & Governance serves as the leading platform for the study of regulation and governance by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, historians, criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists and others. Research on regulation and governance, once fragmented across various disciplines and subject areas, has emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic change in the social sciences. Through the peer-reviewed journal Regulation & Governance, we seek to advance discussions between various disciplines about regulation and governance, promote the development of new theoretical and empirical understanding, and serve the growing needs of practitioners for a useful academic reference.
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