{"title":"员工所有权对组织财务不端行为的非线性影响：组织规模的调节作用。","authors":"Kyoung Yong Kim, Pankaj C Patel","doi":"10.1037/apl0001148","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We used threshold theory to investigate the relationship between employee ownership and financial misdeeds. In particular, we theorized that monitoring and incentive benefits of employee ownership coupled with longer term orientation are two primary theoretical drivers for decreasing the incidence of financial misdeeds in employee-owned firms. Using a sample of 388 investment firms representing 3,421 firm-year observations between 2000 and 2015, we found that employee ownership has an inverted-J-shaped relationship with organizational financial misdeeds such that the negative effect of employee ownership is significant only at medium-to-high levels. We also found that the inverted-J-shaped relationship was stronger when an organization was smaller or practiced giving short-term incentives. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15135,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Psychology","volume":" ","pages":"573-586"},"PeriodicalIF":9.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Nonlinear effect of employee ownership on organizational financial misdeeds: The moderating role of organizational size.\",\"authors\":\"Kyoung Yong Kim, Pankaj C Patel\",\"doi\":\"10.1037/apl0001148\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>We used threshold theory to investigate the relationship between employee ownership and financial misdeeds. In particular, we theorized that monitoring and incentive benefits of employee ownership coupled with longer term orientation are two primary theoretical drivers for decreasing the incidence of financial misdeeds in employee-owned firms. Using a sample of 388 investment firms representing 3,421 firm-year observations between 2000 and 2015, we found that employee ownership has an inverted-J-shaped relationship with organizational financial misdeeds such that the negative effect of employee ownership is significant only at medium-to-high levels. We also found that the inverted-J-shaped relationship was stronger when an organization was smaller or practiced giving short-term incentives. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15135,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Applied Psychology\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"573-586\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":9.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Applied Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001148\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/10/26 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001148","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/10/26 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Nonlinear effect of employee ownership on organizational financial misdeeds: The moderating role of organizational size.
We used threshold theory to investigate the relationship between employee ownership and financial misdeeds. In particular, we theorized that monitoring and incentive benefits of employee ownership coupled with longer term orientation are two primary theoretical drivers for decreasing the incidence of financial misdeeds in employee-owned firms. Using a sample of 388 investment firms representing 3,421 firm-year observations between 2000 and 2015, we found that employee ownership has an inverted-J-shaped relationship with organizational financial misdeeds such that the negative effect of employee ownership is significant only at medium-to-high levels. We also found that the inverted-J-shaped relationship was stronger when an organization was smaller or practiced giving short-term incentives. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Applied Psychology® focuses on publishing original investigations that contribute new knowledge and understanding to fields of applied psychology (excluding clinical and applied experimental or human factors, which are better suited for other APA journals). The journal primarily considers empirical and theoretical investigations that enhance understanding of cognitive, motivational, affective, and behavioral psychological phenomena in work and organizational settings. These phenomena can occur at individual, group, organizational, or cultural levels, and in various work settings such as business, education, training, health, service, government, or military institutions. The journal welcomes submissions from both public and private sector organizations, for-profit or nonprofit. It publishes several types of articles, including:
1.Rigorously conducted empirical investigations that expand conceptual understanding (original investigations or meta-analyses).
2.Theory development articles and integrative conceptual reviews that synthesize literature and generate new theories on psychological phenomena to stimulate novel research.
3.Rigorously conducted qualitative research on phenomena that are challenging to capture with quantitative methods or require inductive theory building.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
