制度改革路径

IF 1.5 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2023-06-25 DOI:10.1111/ecpo.12252

Clemens Buchen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文开发了一个动态种群游戏，其中代理人玩一个简单的合作或叛逃的匿名交换游戏。代理转向具有更高预期回报的策略。改革者可以通过制定法律改革（合同法的制度质量）或关注经济的宏观前景来影响舞台游戏的报酬结构，以最大限度地增加人口中的合作者数量。基于该理论模型，预测了哪些类型的改革者应该首先实施，以及在哪些条件下改革不会成功。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Institutional reform paths

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Institutional reform paths

This paper develops a dynamic population game in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents switch to the strategy with a higher expected payoff. Reformers can affect the payoff structure of the stage game to maximize the number of cooperators in the population by either enacting legal reform (institutional quality of contract law) or focusing on the macro outlook of the economy. Based on the theoretical model, the paper predicts which types the reformer should enact first and under which conditions reform will not be successful.

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来源期刊

Economics & Politics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Economics & Politics focuses on analytical political economy, broadly defined as the study of economic and political phenomena and policy in models that include political processes, institutions and markets. The journal is the source for innovative theoretical and empirical work on the intersection of politics and economics, at both domestic and international levels, and aims to promote new approaches on how these forces interact to affect political outcomes and policy choices, economic performance and societal welfare. Economics & Politics is a vital source of information for economists, academics and students, providing: - Analytical political economics - International scholarship - Accessible & thought-provoking articles - Creative inter-disciplinary analysis