评《中国高等教育能给学生带来什么?》

IF 4.5 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Wei Ha
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在过去的四十年里,中国建立了世界上最大的高等教育体系之一,这是一个不小的成就。中国的高等教育体系非常多样化和复杂,在学生入学的便利性、教学和研究质量以及教育回报方面差异很大。因此,总结其进展或缺乏进展是一项艰巨的任务。李等人(2023)提供了关于中国高等教育回报及其决定因素的新发现。他们的主要结论是,中国的大学教育回报率在显著上升后已经稳定下来,相对较高的回报率在很大程度上是通过信号和社交网络渠道而不是人力资本机制来解释的。然而,李等人(2023)可以通过讨论更广泛的中国文献并将中国高等教育部门的制度细节纳入其分析中来改进。首先,正如李等人(2023)在论文开头正确指出的那样,自1999年以来,中国高等教育的招生人数增长了10倍,由此形成的系统非常多样化和高度分层。精英学院、211工程学院、普通四年制教学学院和三年制职业学院在完全不同的轨道上运行,精英学院在许多方面迅速赶上世界领先大学。扩张不成比例地集中在低层次大学,因此在一定程度上降低了这些大学的教育回报率以及高等教育的总体回报率。李等人(2023)的主要作者李洪斌教授合著的另一篇论文清楚地表明,在1990-2019年期间,年轻工人的大学保险费下降,而老年工人的大学保费增加(李等人,2022)。这一趋势在中国学者的工作中也很明显,例如丁等人(20122013)。尽管我知道抽样在不同层次上不一定具有代表性,也不可能对四组大学进行进一步分析,但李等人(2023)的总体结论需要合格。其次,中国劳动力市场也相当多样化。双重劳动力市场理论无法充分捕捉其复杂性。公共部门的工作具有很强的稳定性和较高的福利,而名义工资相对较低。私营部门主要依靠薪水,但领先的公司甚至可以吸引精英大学的毕业生。因此,李等人(2023)中的等式(1)至少需要控制毕业生所在的行业。选择的城市/地区/行业也是如此,因为这些都极大地塑造了大学毕业生将享受的工作与生活平衡。第三,虽然我很欣赏李等人(2023)将决定因素分为人力资本、社会网络和信号三种机制的努力,但使用现有数据可能很难确定它们的独立影响。例如,得出大学人力资本积累不会为学生带来适当回报的结论可能为时过早,因为以平均绩点(GPA)为代表的人力资本可能会影响学生的长期社会经济地位,从而可能在国外或中国获得研究生院的名额。李等人(2023)的表3准确地表明,打算上研究生院的学生的GPA要高得多。即使在毕业后立即进入劳动力市场的学生中,他们的GPA也与其他两个维度的其他变量存在一定的相关性。特别是,当地方政党组织考虑招募谁作为其成员时,GPA绝对是标准之一。在社会网络方面,父母收入是社会资本还是经济资本?其他研究人员利用父母是否在公共部门工作、是否是党员或是否担任公职来研究这个问题。父母教育通常被用来衡量文化资本。此外,学生的高考成绩是一个信号,还是衡量学生在上大学之前积累的人力资本?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comment on “What Can Students Gain from China's Higher Education?”

Over the past four decades, China has built up one of the largest higher education systems in the world which is no small achievement. The Chinese higher education system is very diverse and complex, and varies a great deal in terms of ease of access for students, the quality of teaching and research, and the returns to education. Therefore, summarizing its progress or the lack of it is a daunting task. Li et al. (2023) offer fresh findings on the returns to higher education in China and their determinants. Their main conclusions are that the returns to college education in China have stabilized after a significant rise and the relatively high returns are largely explained away by signaling and social networks channels as opposed to the human capital mechanism. However, Li et al. (2023) can be improved by talking to the broader Chinese literature and incorporating the institutional details of the higher education sector in China into its analysis.

First of all, as Li et al. (2023) rightly point out in the beginning of their paper that the enrollment in Chinese higher education has experienced a 10-fold expansion since 1999 and the resultant system is very diverse and highly stratified. The elite colleges, 211 project colleges, regular 4-year teaching colleges and 3-year vocational colleges operate in utterly different orbits with the elite colleges catching up quickly with the leading universities in the world on many fronts. The expansion concentrated disproportionally on the lower-tier universities, and therefore drove down the returns to an education in these universities as well as the overall returns to higher education to some extent. Another paper coauthored by the lead author of Li et al. (2023), Prof. Hongbin Li, clearly shows that the college premium for young workers declined while the college premium for senior workers increased over the period 1990–2019 (Li et al., 2022). This trend is also evident in work of Chinese scholars, for example, Ding et al. (2012, 2013). Although I understand the sampling is not necessarily representative at the different tiers and further analysis of the four groups of universities may not be possible, the overall conclusion of Li et al. (2023) needs to be qualified.

Second, the Chinese labor market is also quite diverse. Dual labor market theory would not adequately capture its complexity. Public sector jobs couple strong stability and high benefits with relatively low nominal salaries. The private sector mostly relies on salaries but leading firms can attract even graduates of elite colleges. Therefore equation (1) in Li et al. (2023) at least needs to control for the sector the graduates landed in. The same goes for the city/region/industries of choice as these greatly shape the kind of work–life balance college graduates will enjoy.

Third, while I appreciate the Li et al.'s (2023) efforts to categorize the determinants into the three mechanisms of human capital, social network, and signaling, it might be difficult to pinpoint their independent effects using existing data. For example, it might be premature to draw the conclusion that human capital accumulation in college does not generate the proper returns for students because human capital proxied by the grade point average (GPA) may affect students' long-term socio-economic status through the possibility of securing a spot for graduate school abroad or in China. Li et al.'s (2023) table 3 shows exactly that students who intend to go to graduate school have much higher GPAs. Even among students who enter the labor market immediately upon graduation, their GPAs are somewhat correlated with other variables in the other two dimensions. In particular, when local party organizations consider who to recruit as their member, GPA is definitely one of the criteria.

On the social network front, is parental income social capital or economic capital? Other researchers have looked at this question using whether or not parents work in the public sector, whether or not they are party members or whether or not they hold public offices. Parental education is usually used as a measure of cultural capital. Moreover, is a student's score on a college entrance exam a signal or a measure of the student's cumulative human capital prior to college?

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来源期刊
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.60%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The goal of the Asian Economic Policy Review is to become an intellectual voice on the current issues of international economics and economic policy, based on comprehensive and in-depth analyses, with a primary focus on Asia. Emphasis is placed on identifying key issues at the time - spanning international trade, international finance, the environment, energy, the integration of regional economies and other issues - in order to furnish ideas and proposals to contribute positively to the policy debate in the region.
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