公共产品供应谈判不透明

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI:10.1111/jpet.12646

Julian Lamprecht, Marcel Thum

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑就提供公共产品进行最后通牒谈判。报价制定者和响应者可以将他们的决策委托给实际决策规则不透明的代理人。我们表明，即使有双边代表团，回应者也将从战略不透明中受益。战略不透明选择所产生的不完全信息不会导致均衡中的低效谈判失败。效率低下是由于供应水平低下造成的。虽然总是会达成协议，但公益条款将达不到社会期望的水平。与单方面代表团相比，从福利角度来看，双边代表团从未如此糟糕。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

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Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

自引率

36.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.