上游市场结构和下游部分所有权

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Jie Shuai, Mengyuan Xia, Chenhang Zeng
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引用次数: 1

摘要

现有的关于部分所有权的研究通常忽略了纵向相关市场的影响。我们的论文强调了上游市场对下游企业获得部分所有权的激励以及由此产生的福利影响的重要性。在主模型中,我们假设下游市场有三家公司,其中两家可能形成部分所有权安排。我们发现了一些与文献中的结果相反的结果。首先,如果上游市场是寡头垄断(三寡头或双寡头),两家公司将拥有部分所有权。其次,部分所有制可以提高总产量、消费者剩余和社会福利。当上游市场由双头垄断组成,并且参与部分所有权的两家公司由不同的供应商供应时,就会发生这种情况。第三,局外人,在文献中通常被称为搭便车者,可能成为部分所有权的受害者。我们的结果在几个扩展方面是稳健的,包括一般的n$n$-公司框架、产品差异化和上游公司的统一定价。我们还提供了需求函数的曲率和成本函数的凸性激励企业形成部分所有权的条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership

Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume that there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may form a partial ownership arrangement. We find several results that are in contrast to those in the literature. First, the two firms will engage in partial ownership if the upstream market is an oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, partial ownership may raise total production, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of a duopoly and the two firms involved in partial ownership are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the outsider, commonly known as a free rider in the literature, may become a victim of partial ownership. Our results are robust to several extensions, including a general n $n$ -firm framework, product differentiation, and uniform pricing by upstream firms. We also provide the conditions under which the curvature of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function motivate firms to form partial ownership.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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