税收竞争、公共投入和市场力量

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Public Economic Theory Pub Date : 2022-11-15 DOI:10.1111/jpet.12632

Steve Billon

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引用次数: 0

摘要

与住宅公共产品相比，提供工业公共产品的地方司法管辖区数量的增加可能会导致均衡税率的上升。当地方司法管辖区是利维坦时，竞争的增加可能会扩大税收，从而无法驯服利维坦，这与传统观点相反。

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Tax competition, public input, and market power

An increase in the number of local jurisdictions providing industrial public goods may lead to a rise in the equilibrium tax rate, in contrast to the case of residential public goods. When local jurisdictions are Leviathans, an increase in competition may expand tax revenues and thus fail to tame the Leviathan, contrary to the conventional wisdom.

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

自引率

36.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.